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Die Welt und das Reale

The World and the Real

Le monde et le réel

Herausgegeben von | edited by | éd. par
Karel Novotný & Cathrin Nielsen

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Vorwort

Der vorliegende Band entstand im Rahmen einer Konferenz zum Thema „Die Welt und das Reale“ im Juni 2018 in Prag. Anlass für das Thema war nicht zuletzt die aktuelle Debatte um den neuen Realismus und seine Kritik am Korrelationismus, zu dem üblicherweise auch die phänomenologische Philosophie gezählt wird. Wir haben jedoch zunächst ohne expliziten Bezug zu dieser Debatte internationale Forscherinnen und Forscher dazu eingeladen, den Status der Welt – aber auch allgemeiner den Status des Erscheinens – vor allem von phänomenologischen Ansätzen aus neu zu diskutieren. Einer der Kerngedanken dabei war, die Idee des Realen als etwas Widerständiges zu fassen, als etwas, was sich der Welt entzieht, statt sich, wie die Realität, durch Weltlichkeit zu definieren.

Wenn das Reale bei Edmund Husserl so nur aus der Welt heraus begegnen kann – als Realität –, dann scheint das Einzige, was sich Husserl zufolge der Welt entzieht, mit der Frage nach dem Ursprung der Welt verbunden zu sein. Es wäre dann etwas, was der Welt genetisch vorangeht oder vorausliegt. Saulius Geniusas und István Fazakas zeigen in ihren Beiträgen wesentliche Dimensionen der Problematik der Genesis der Welt bei Husserl, aber – sofern dies am zentralen Begriff der Apperzeption bzw. an Begriffen wie Affektivität der Instinkte oder Phantasie geschieht – auch über Husserl hinaus auf. Auch der dem phänomenologischen Zugang zur Intentionalität gewidmete Beitrag von Denis Seron, der sich vor allem auf Franz Brentano bezieht, gehört in diesen Problemhorizont. Dem Status der Welt im Genaueren bei Husserl sind noch drei weitere Beiträge gewidmet: Claudia Serban diskutiert das problematische Konzept der „Weltvernichtung“, um auf die Schweben zwischen dem Möglichkeits- und dem Notwendigkeitscharakter der Welt hinzuweisen. Daniele de Santis konzentriert sich auf die These von einer einzigen realen Welt, wie sie aus der *V. Cartesianischen Meditation* entwickelt werden kann. Die geschichtliche Dimension der Welt, wie sie der

späte Husserl in seiner Krisis-Schrift einführt, wird im Beitrag von Kwok-ying Lau vorgestellt.

Eine andere Gruppe der eingeladenen Autorinnen und Autoren beschäftigt sich mit der Philosophie Jan Patočkas, der sich bekanntlich sein Leben lang mit der Auffassung der natürlichen Welt in der Tradition der Husserl'schen Philosophie kritisch auseinandergesetzt hat. Die Beiträge dieser Gruppe gehen auf jeweils unterschiedliche Phasen und Aspekte des Werks dieses Philosophen ein: Saverio Matrangelo lotet Patočkas frühen Bezug auf den „intuitiven Realismus“ bei Nikolaj Lossky in den 1930er Jahren aus; den lebensphilosophischen Entwurf der transzendentalphänomenologischen Weltproblematik Patočkas aus den frühen 1940er Jahren thematisiert Marco Barcaro. Darauf folgen drei Diskussionen von Patočkas späterer „a-subjektiver“ Phänomenologie der Weltform der Erfahrung bzw. des Erscheinens als solchem, jeweils mit Bezügen auf andere Ansätze. So nimmt Seongha Hong das zentrale Thema für die Entwicklung der Weltproblematik nicht nur bei Patočka, sondern auch bei anderen Autoren auf: der Auseinandersetzung mit Husserl und Heidegger im Rahmen der Kosmologie Eugen Finks. Sandra Lehmann weist in ihrem Beitrag mögliche Bezugnahmen des erwähnten Ansatzes bei Patočka auf den heutigen Neo-Vitalismus und eine bestimmte spekulative Ontologie auf. Filip Borek orientiert sich in seiner kritischen Hinterfragung der „a-subjektiven“ Phänomenologie Patočkas als Suche nach dem Ursprung des Erscheinens vor allem an der Idee des sich notwendig entziehenden Grundes bei Martin Heidegger. Dieser Denker wird im Beitrag von Tobias Keiling mit der These einer Pluralität der Welten konfrontiert und verteidigt. Der Weltphilosophie Heideggers ist hinsichtlich ihrer Idee des „Offenen“ dagegen ein kritischer Beitrag von Ovidiu Stanciu gewidmet, der gegen Heideggers Deutung des Offenen bei Rilke eine Perspektive im Sinne der Physis rehabilitiert, die sich auf Fink und Renaud Barbaras stützt.

Das Reale als etwas, das die Welt durchbricht und Widerstand leistet, wird im vorliegenden Band vor allem mit einem Fokus verbunden, nämlich mit der Körperlichkeit. Cathrin Nielsen und Eric Pommier zeigen in ihren Beiträgen Aspekte des Realen des Körpers auf, Nielsen im Blick auf das sich dem Narrativen entziehende Skandalon des Somatischen, Pommier hinsichtlich einer Phänomenologie des Fleisches bei Jean-Luc Marion. Das Reale als Widerständiges ist jedoch nicht nur mit der Erfahrung des Körpers verbunden, wie Michaela Summa zeigt – auch das Imaginäre kann, als fiktive Erfahrung, widerständig wirken.

Die scharfe Unterscheidung des Realen und der Welt und somit auch die Inspiration zur Veranstaltung der Konferenz und Konzeption des vorliegenden Bandes verdanken wir unserem Kollegen Hans Rainer Sepp. Die Grundproblematik ist in seinem Beitrag prägnant zusammengefasst:

Idealismen und Realismen als europäischen Konstrukten des Denkens ist die Voraussetzung gemeinsam, dass der Zugang zum Realen ein erkennender ist und sein soll, wobei gemeinhin nicht zwischen dem Realen und der Realität unterschieden wird. Das Reale zum Thema zu machen, bedeutet folglich, diese Voraussetzung infrage zu stellen und nach der Zugangsweise zu fragen, in der so etwas wie ‚das Reale‘ begegnet. Mit der Fixierung dieser Zugangsweise wird es auch möglich, das Reale in einen Bezug zu einem weiteren Begriff, nämlich den der *Welt*, zu bringen und die Frage zu stellen, inwiefern auf diesen Grundlagen einer Bestimmung des Realen, der Welt und der Realität ein Denken des ‚Ganzen‘ möglich wird, also das, was man traditionellerweise als Metaphysik bezeichnet.

Die Fakultät für Geisteswissenschaften der Karls-Universität Prag – und das hier verankerte Programm „Text und Bild in der Phänomenologie und Semiotik“ (Progres Q 21) – war neben dem Philosophischen Institut der Akademie der Wissenschaften der Tschechischen Republik und dem Programm Erasmus Master Mundus Europhilosophie auch der Hauptsponsor sowohl der Konferenz als auch der Publikation des daraus entstandenen vorliegenden Bandes. Für die redaktionelle Unterstützung bei den englisch- und französischsprachigen Beiträgen danken wir Elizabeth A. Behnke, Julie Cottier und Pablo Varela Posada.

Prag, im April 2020

A. Die Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls

Husserl's Concepts of *Apperzeption* and *Weltapperzeption*

Saulius Geniusas

Here I wish to address the philosophical significance of Husserl's concepts of *apperzeption* in general, and *world-apperzeption* in particular, by paying special attention to the manuscripts collected in Part VII of Hua XXXIX.¹ In these manuscripts—the earliest of which were written in 1916, the latest in 1936 (most were composed between 1930 and 1934)—we come across Husserl's most detailed reflections on the apperceptive structures of experience. Three goals will guide my analysis. First, by juxtaposing Husserl's concept of apperzeption with how this concept was employed by his predecessors, I will clarify the concept's specific meaning in Husserl's phenomenology. Second, it will be crucial to see that in Husserl's phenomenology, apperzeption functions as an umbrella term that covers a large variety of non-intuitive modes of consciousness that are synthetically unified with intuitive consciousness and are apprehended as if they were modes of intuitive consciousness. *Apperzeption is a matter of intending something that is not originally present as if it were originally present*: this is the core meaning of the concept that we come across in many highly diverse contexts of analysis in Husserl's phenomenology. Furthermore, it will be important to recognize that Husserl's concept of apperzeption admits of different levels of generality, which in turn will enable us to see what is unique about his concept of world-apperzeption. And third, I will conclude my analysis with some reflec-

¹ These manuscripts are significantly titled "The World as Acquisition: Structure and Genesis of World-Apperzeption and the Apperzeption of Worldly Entities" (see Husserl 2008, 409–556).

tions on the genetic origins of world-constitution in general and world-apperception in particular.

1. Apperception as a Phenomenological Concept

It is well known that Husserl often employs established philosophical concepts in unusual ways by infusing them with unprecedented meanings.² He does so not out of caprice or ignorance, but out of the uncompromising conviction that phenomenology marks the rebirth of philosophical radicalism, which would be compromised if one employed philosophical concepts uncritically. As long as we read into phenomenological concepts the sense they have acquired in other philosophical traditions, we run the risk of misunderstanding their function, meaning, and significance.

This is of importance when it comes to Husserl's use of the concept of *apperception*. In the history of modern philosophy, and especially when it comes to such thinkers as Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (who invented the concept of apperception) and Immanuel Kant (who brought to light its fundamental significance for transcendental philosophy in general), the concept of apperception was juxtaposed with that of perception. According to Leibniz, while perception provides us with access to external things, apperception is the source of our awareness of internal states. Much like Leibniz, Kant too conceives of apperception as an activity that is parallel to perceiving (see Kant 1998, A 120). According to Kant, apperception is the mode of self-consciousness that enables the subject to attribute all its representations to itself. Kant famously distinguishes between three forms of syntheses—namely, those of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition—

² See Husserl's own "terminological discussion," which concludes his Introduction to *Ideas I* (Husserl 1976, 8–9/2002, 5–6). Here Husserl writes: "Since it is not advisable to choose technical expressions which fall wholly outside the framework of traditional philosophical speech, and, above all, since the fundamental concepts of philosophy cannot be defined through stable concepts that can be identified at any time by reference to a directly accessible intuitional basis; since rather it is only, as a rule, after protracted inquiries that they can be finally cleared up and determined: it is often indispensable to make use of a set of speech-forms which group together in an orderly way a *number* of current expressions bearing closely equivalent meanings, the individual members of the group being terminologically distinguished one from the other" (ibid. 9/6).

and he employs the concept of apperception with reference to the judgment that performs the syntheses of recognition.³ Husserl significantly broadens the meaning of apperception. While for Leibniz and Kant apperception is fundamentally self-apperception, conceived as a peculiar mode of self-

³ We are in need of a further clarification, although here we must limit ourselves to some rather brief remarks. For Leibniz, the concept of apperception serves the purpose of distinguishing those perceptions that are conscious from those that are not. It also serves the purpose of distinguishing creatures that are capable of reflection and self-awareness (human beings) from those creatures that lack such a capacity (non-human animals as well as bare monads). Leibniz distinguishes between three different types of monads depending on the different kinds of perception they are capable of. There are monads such as non-human animals that are capable of conscious perceptions; there are monads such as human beings who are capable of self-conscious perceptions; and finally, there are monads such as mere entelechies that have no memories and are only capable of non-conscious perceptions. With this general distinction in mind, in his *Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason* (1714), Leibniz writes: "It is good to distinguish between a *perception*, which is the internal state of the monad representing external things, and *apperception*, which is *consciousness*, or the reflective knowledge of the internal state, something not given to all souls, nor at all times to a given soul" (Leibniz 1989, 208). As Franklin Perkins observes, "apperception is one of Leibniz's key terms, referring to perceptions that are consciously recognized" (Perkins 2007, 110). Leibniz employs the concept of apperception as a mode of self-consciousness (hence the identification of apperception with consciousness in the passage quoted above) and contends that there are perceptions that we do not apperceive ("there are a thousand indications that allow us to judge that at every moment there is an infinity of perceptions in us, but without apperception" [Leibniz 1989, 295]). It should therefore be understandable why, in contrast to Descartes, Leibniz refuses to identify the concept of perception with that of thought. According to Leibniz, all monads have perceptions, yet not all monads are conscious of having perceptions. Kant borrows the concept of apperception from Leibniz, modifies it, and develops it further when he clarifies *the principle of the necessary unity of apperception* in the following way: "It must be the case that each of my representations is such that I can attribute it to my self, a subject which is the same for all of my self-attributions, which is distinct from its representations, and which can be conscious of its representations" (Kant 1998, A116, B131–2, B134–5). This capacity to attribute representations to the self is exactly what Kant, following Leibniz, identifies as the power of apperception, which he further conceives of as the condition of possibility of objective unity. Thus the pure power of apperception turns out to be "the thoroughgoing *identity* of the self in all possible representations" (ibid. B131–2).

consciousness, Husserl considers self-apperception to be one mode of apperception alongside the apperception of the world (*Weltapperzeption*) and apperception of entities in the world (*Apperzeptionen von weltlich Seiendem*). How are we to understand such an unprecedented broadening of the concept's meaning?

As soon as one recognizes that perception is fundamentally and irreducibly a mode of *intentionality*, it no longer suffices, as in Kant, to clarify the unity of apperception as the transcendental unity of self-apperception. If perception is a mode of intentional consciousness, then besides self-apperception, there must also be an apperception of things in the world, and even apperception of the world itself. In Husserl's phenomenology, these three forms of apperception (*self-apperception, world-apperception, and thing-apperception*) prove to be inseparable moments of one and the same *apperceptive structure of experience*. Yet it is crucial to stress that the concept does not merely undergo an unprecedented broadening in Husserl's phenomenology, for here we also witness a transformation of meaning that affects each structural element of apperception. This means, among other things, that the concept of self-apperception also changes its meaning in Husserl's phenomenology. I can apperceive myself as a European, a Lithuanian, or a resident of Hong Kong, as a member of the academic community, a philosopher, a phenomenologist, etc. These different forms of self-apperception already entail a peculiar mode of world-apperception. Thus the continents, countries, and cities we live in can form their own distinctive worlds; likewise, we can speak of the world of philosophy, or even the world of phenomenology. Moreover, let us not overlook that these specific modes of self-apperception and world-apperception also co-determine the meaning of appearing objectivities. An old book from Husserl's private library that is filled with his private notes accordingly means something different to someone who inhabits the world of phenomenology and to someone who is part of the world of trade, just as an ancient building carries a different meaning depending on whether one inhabits the world of architecture, archaeology, or engineering. This is something we all know: we can be worlds apart, or we can also inhabit one and the same world (or both, although not in the same sense of the term).

Yet is it not true that the different worlds of which we speak here are worlds only by equivocation and that in truth they all belong to one and the same world? Clearly, the answer will depend on how one understands the concept of the world. Following Husserl, let us draw a distinction between

cultural worlds, conceived as specific surrounding worlds (*Umwelten*) and as products of intersubjective and intergenerational constitution, and the world taken in its all-encompassing generality, which in phenomenology is sometimes described as the horizon of all horizons. We have already seen that cultural worlds are apperceptively formed unities of sense that are intentionally bound with specific forms of self-apperception. According to Husserl, besides the cultural worlds, *the all-encompassing world is also an apperceptively formed world that is intentionally bound with a peculiar mode of self-apperception, viz., mundane self-apperception*. For the ego to apperceive itself as a mundane ego means nothing other than to apperceive itself as a member of the all-encompassing world. Moreover, as soon as the ego apperceives itself as a mundane ego, from that moment on, everything that affects this ego is immediately apperceived as a mundane entity that belongs to the all-encompassing world.

At this point we have all that is needed to distinguish Husserl's concept of apperception from how this concept was understood by his predecessors. *The phenomenological concept of apperception refers to the essential structure of intentional experience, whose three essential moments are those of self-apperception, world-apperception, and thing-apperception.*⁴ In this regard, there are no essential differences between the specific surrounding worlds and the all-encompassing world.

⁴ As an example, take any simple act of perception. Here is this cup of coffee that sits on the table in front of you. What you perceive directly in original experience is nothing more than one aspect of the object. What you see, however, is not just an adumbration (*Abschattung*) of the thing, but the thing itself. This means that strictly speaking, you do not perceive the thing (insofar as the concept of perception is used interchangeably with that of original presentation), but apperceive it. Moreover, this thing in front of you is not isolated from all the other things in the surroundings. The cup of coffee is on the table, which is itself in the room, which is itself in the building, etc. Insofar as you apprehend the object as belonging to its surroundings (and you must apprehend it this way!), you apperceive it as belonging to the actual world. Furthermore, to apprehend the object as a thing in the world, you must also apperceive yourself as a mundane ego. And in addition, you also must be conscious of each and every moment of experience as belonging to the one stream of your own experience. In short, the appresentation of any object goes hand in hand with self-apperception. We thereby see how the three figures of apperception are bound to each other with an intentional knot.

2. *Types and Structures of Apperceptive Consciousness*

Let us proceed to a more precise determination of apperceptive consciousness. In Husserl's phenomenology, the concept of apperception functions as an umbrella term that covers a large variety of non-intuitive modes of consciousness that do not conflict with, but are synthetically unified with intuitive consciousness. *Experience is much broader than purely intuitive consciousness.* I see the tree in front of me, or at least I think that I see it. Yet a closer look requires me to admit that what I see is only an adumbration, which I interpret as an aspect of the tree. *We always mean more than we see.* This irreducible excess of meaning brings to light the synthetic unity that binds intuitive with non-intuitive modes of consciousness. Insofar as consciousness is condensed to the level of original intuition and is incapable of such syntheses, it is also incapable either of perceiving mundane things or of experiencing the world itself. Thus the apperception of things is entirely dependent upon our capacity to synthesize intuitive with non-intuitive modes of consciousness. It is only insofar as consciousness knows how to synthesize the original content given to intuitive consciousness with the sedimented content that derives from non-intuitive consciousness that we can be conscious of things and the world, and not just of the original content of our own experiences (*Erlebnisse*).

Ever since the 1890s, Husserl was strongly committed to the view that—with the British empiricists in mind—William James had formulated especially forcefully: “no one has ever had a simple sensation by itself” (James 1950, 224). Following in James's footsteps, Husserl repeatedly maintains that experience (*Erfahrung*) is not reducible to the passive intake of sensory data.⁵ We always mean more than we see, hear, taste, touch, or smell. This surplus of sense is irreducible, and therefore it is fully legitimate to qualify experience (*Erfahrung*) as a synthetic unity of perceptions and apperceptions.⁶ Consider what is going on right now as you are reading this

⁵ “*Das Bewusstsein ist nicht ein white paper, ein dunkler Raum, in den von außen Bilder von weltlichen Objekten und so ein Weltbild hineingewirkt ist, sondern es ist ein lebendiges Werden, und dabei nicht bloß ein passives, sondern zugleich in einem ständigen engeren Umkreis eine ständig leistende Aktivität, die in unterster fundierender Stufe schon erfahrendes Tun ist.*” (Husserl 2008, 448)

⁶ Admittedly, in Husserl's phenomenology in general, and in Hua XXXIX in particular, the concept of perception is ambiguous. Sometimes Husserl conceives of it as a

text. What you actually see is nothing more than a collection of certain geometrical shapes. Your consciousness, however, is not reducible to the intake of these data. Rather, in these geometrical shapes, you apperceive the letters of the alphabet; not just letters, but words; not just words, but sentences in paragraphs, paragraphs in sections, sections in chapters, with distinct sets of meanings. The same is to be said about phenomena that are intended in other forms of intuitive or non-intuitive consciousness. We can see apperceptions at work in *all* domains of conscious life: this concept refers to all dimensions of sense that are co-present in direct experience, although they are not reducible to the directly given contents of experience.

In his lectures on passive synthesis, Husserl defines the type of apperception he terms “presentification” (*Vergegenwärtigung*) as “a consciousness of having something that is not present in the original” (Husserl 1966, 234/2001, 367, translation modified). Moreover, in Hua XXXIX, he further describes apperception as an *as if* mode of consciousness (see especially Husserl 2008, Text Nr. 44). He contends that apperception is the constant function due to which what has *not* arisen from one’s own original experience is apprehended *as if* it has so originated. Husserl is well aware of the ambiguity this turn of phrase is bound to provoke; with this in mind he writes: “but *the as-if is still not that of sheer phantasy*” (ibid. 504). While in the case of phantasy-consciousness, one experiences a conflict between actuality and non-actuality (and thus one knows that the imagined unicorn has no place in one’s actual world), in the case of the apperception of mundane objects, no such conflict is to be found. This allows us to claim that a crucial requirement that underlies the different formations of apperceptive consciousness is that these formations stand in harmony with what is given in direct intuitive experience, for only in this way can the contents of apperceptive consciousness be conceived as if they were directly experienced contents.

Experience is a synthetic unity of perceptions and apperceptions, a unity that can take highly diverse forms. Thus experience is always already a synthesis that integrates the content given in intuitive and non-intuitive consciousness. Yet where exactly does the non-intuitive content derive

synthesis of direct presentations and appresentations (see ibid. Text Nr. 40). Other times it refers to intuitive acts, or direct presentations, through which the intuitive content of experience comes to self-givenness. In the present context, we are referring to the second meaning of the term.

from? Husserl's detailed reflections suggest that the origins of apperceptive consciousness are of two different kinds. The non-intuitive content can stem from our own past experience,⁷ or it can derive from consciousness that is not our own—the consciousness of others, which we have appropriated as if it were our own.⁸ In our present experience, we take over the way we have seen the world in the past, or the way other human beings (and even other non-human animals) see it; in virtue of such modes of sense-transference, we continuously broaden our “world-presentations” and constitute our worlds (cf. *ibid.* 511).

What interests us in the present context are those apperceptions through which things in the world, and the world itself, are constituted. Much like mundane consciousness, phantasy-consciousness is also apperceptive through and through (see Husserl 1980/2005). However, phantasy-consciousness is guided by more flexible rules and is therefore more arbitrary than mundane consciousness. With the examples already mentioned in mind, we can ask: why is it so that when it comes to reading, I apperceive the given geometrical shapes precisely as letters of the alphabet? Likewise, why is it so that when it comes to “that thing” in front of my window, I apperceive it as a tree? Of course, I *could* apperceive these intuitive contents differently. Yet insofar as mundane experience is concerned, we draw quite clear distinctions between appropriate and inappropriate apperceptions. It is especially important to stress the following two points. First, justified mundane apperceptions are those apperceptions that do not conflict with, but form a harmonious unity with other mundane apperceptions within the stream of experience. And second, justified mundane apperceptions are those apperceptions that can obtain intersubjective verification. To be sure, the harmonious nature of mundane experience can break down both within the stream of experience and in the context of intersubjective experience.

⁷ “Auf das neu Affizierende in seiner Änderung übertrage ich den aus Aktivität stammenden Seinssinn, als Vorgewissheit, ihn als Identitätswiederholung aktivieren zu können” (*ibid.* 432). Thus when I am affected by particular contents of experience, I apperceive them from the very beginning as objects that entail a specific objective sense. In this way I constantly live in apperceptive transference of sense.

⁸ “Aber Wissensbeläge können auch durch ‘Tradition’ entspringen, durch Übernahme eines Urteils und durch Übertragung auf das Erfahrene” (*ibid.* 424f.). Thus once I learn that the dark spots on the moon are mountains, from that moment on I see these spots as mountains. My experience thereby absorbs and reproduces a non-intuitive content that was never intuitive.

Such conflicts, however, need to be overcome, and the harmonious nature of experience needs to be reestablished if we are to identify apperceptions as formative of world-experience.

One of the fundamental goals of Husserl's analysis of apperceptions is to clarify how specific types of mundane apperceptions are formed and why they are deemed appropriate in specific circumstances. According to Husserl, it is we ourselves who form all the mundane apperceptions that continue to guide us in the course of our subsequent mundane experience. This means that the formation of these apperceptions is irreducibly subjective, although by no means arbitrary. It thereby becomes clear that the concept of apperception denotes the fundamental law of growing and continuously expanding experiential formations. All the experiences we have undergone in the past, as well as all our current and future experiences, do not merely entail a specific experiential content that comes and goes in the stream of consciousness. While all experiences stream in, there is a sense in which they do not stream away. We retain them as our own habitual possessions. All our experiences shape specific types of apperceptive consciousness that continue to guide us in our subsequent experience.

Apperceptions admit of highly diverse levels of generality. On the one hand, any object of experience whatsoever, insofar as it is not reducible to the experiential content of intuitive consciousness, is always already apperceptively formed. To refer to one of Husserl's own examples, once I see a gorilla for the first time, from that moment on every other gorilla is already a gorilla—a being that is from the start apperceived as that specific non-human animal. Each time I see a gorilla, the sight of the animal reactivates a pre-given apperceptive type of experience, quite likely enlarging this type, determining it more closely, and bringing to light its new characteristic features (see Husserl 2008, 448). Here we have a very low level of generality, one that concerns only one kind of object of experience. On the other hand, at the other end of the spectrum, the most general types of experience are also formed apperceptively. Thus in Appendix XXXIV to Hua XXXIX, Husserl draws a distinction between the most general types through which things in the world obtain their most general determinacy. Husserl speaks of *lifeless things* (one can think of natural rock formations, sand on the beach, clouds in the sky, etc.); of *animals* (both human and non-human); of *cultural objects* (various things designed to serve our practical purposes, various tools, works of art, linguistic signs, etc.); and of *subjects-objects* conceived as carriers of cultural meanings (human beings conceived as members of differ-

ent associations and communities, as representatives of different professions, as teachers or students, citizens, etc.). Once these general apperceptive types are constituted, they continue to shape the look of things in the course of our subsequent experience. Consider what happens when you find yourself in distant lands and are surrounded by unfamiliar things. Even under such circumstances, you continue to subsume the content of direct presentations under these general apperceptive types of experience. You still encounter either lifeless things, or animals, or cultural objects, or subjects-objects, no matter how indeterminate the intentional correlates of your experience might be.

With regard to the temporal modalities of experience, Husserl draws a distinction between *analogizing* and *indicative apperception*. Analogizing apperception enables us to apprehend presently given phenomena through analogy with the past. The intuitive core of presently given experience brings back the memory of what we have experienced in the past, and this memory motivates us to transfer the sense from the past to the present.⁹ Our capacity to name things, viz., to schematize them in accordance with pre-given types of experience, is an accomplishment of analogizing apperception. And not only that: our capacity to recognize any mundane object whatsoever for what it is, is already an accomplishment of analogizing apperception.

Through analogizing apperception, then, we apprehend presently given phenomena. In contrast, indicative apperception can also be retrospective (*rückgreifende Apperzeption*) and anticipatory (*vorgreifende Apperzeption*). A certain intuitive content that is given in the present indicates a set of events that have either taken place in the past or will take place in the future. Guided by retrospective apperception, we apprehend the ancient ruins as indicative of the glory of past historical life; guided by anticipatory apperception, we apperceive the clouds in the sky as indicative of the approaching storm.

⁹ One cannot ignore David Hume's influence on Husserl in these analyses. According to Husserl, analogizing apperceptions function as a transference of existential validity (*Seinsgeltung*) from a remembered A to a similar perceived B. This transference is a matter of association. On this basis, Husserl further maintains that world-experience is a universal synthesis of association: "Durch die strömende Welterfahrung geht hindurch eine ständige *Synthesis der Assoziation*" (see *ibid.* 461). For Husserl's own more elaborate conception of association, see Husserl 1966, 117–191/2001, 162–242).