In contrast to the ever-growing body of secondary literature on the Czech phi losopher Jan Patocka, little of his work has been translated into English and some of those works which have been translated are now out of print, As such this new volume, Asubjective Phenomenology, containing translations of two of Patocka's texts, in addition to a collection of twelve articles by contributors, is eminently welcome.
The two texts by Patocka - "Husserl's Subjectivism and the Call for an Asubjective Phenomenology" and "Epoche and Reduction: Some Observations" - present his critiques of Husserlian phenomenology and the outline of his own project of an asubjective phenomenology. The editors and translators have done a great service to Patocka scholarship in Enghsh by choosing these texts, as no work had so far been translated into English which dealt with this intriguing aspect of Patocka's work. The first text in the volume, "Husserl's Subjectivism", is the longer of the two at just over 21 pages, while «Epoche and Reduction" is shorter at just 10 pages. In contrast to the majority of Patocka's work, these two texts were originally written in German rather than Czech, and the translators provide the German terms in brackets wherever ambiguities might arise from the English. In the case of these highly technical texts, this seems to be a wise decision, and overall the translations are excellent.
Patocka begins the first text with the suggestion that the true promise of Husserl's insights from the Logical Investigations and from Ideas I lay in their paving the way for what he calls an asubjective phenomenology "that is not beholden to a subject severed frorn the world" (18). Broadly speaking, his argument is that remnants of Cartesianism - which he later specifies as being rather remnants of Brentanoism (29) - stopped Husserl from seeing the radical possibility opened up by his early phenomenological insights and led him to absolutize the transcendental subject.
In order to make this argument, in the first part of the essay Patocka traces the history of philosophical "analysis of the notion of a being's modes of appearance" (19), beginning with Plato's Seventh Letter and ending with Husserl. Patocka claims that this problem of modes of appearance (Erscheinungsweise) remained in the background throughout the history of western philosophy until Husserl's breakthrough in the Logical Investigations. The next part of the essay consists in Patocka's account of how an ontology inherited from Brentano continued to influence Husserl's thinking and overall direction. In particular, Patocka's critique focuses on the role of living-experience (Erlebnis) and the controversial role of 'hyletic data' in Husserl's thinking.
Patocka's own suggestion is that we abandon the primacy of the transcendental ego in favour of a primacy of the phenomenal field within which both subject and object are constituted: "The phenomenon is not the accomplishment of subjective constitution. Rather, the 'subjective' possibilities themselves only become clear in phenomena" (38). This is the sense in which he means asubjective phenomenology; rather than a phenomenology which 'abandons' subjectivity, it is one in which subjectivity loses its primacy vis-à-vis the phenornenon.
lt is indeed essential that the second text, 'Epoché and Reduction', is provided next, for here we find a further dve1opment of these thoughts. At the start of the text, Patocka sets up the problem of the relationship between constitution and reduction in phenomcnology. After laying out the basic problem, Patocka goes on to sharply differentiate the epoche from the reduction, claiming that Husserl is too quick to move from epoche to reduction, and ultimately to constitution. Patocka suggests, rather, that within the epoche there lies more than sirnply a step towards the reduction and the uncovering of the constituting activity of consciousness: what he advocates is an epoche carried through to the extreme, such that all theses about the subjective would be suspended too:
In an epoche thus performed, I certainly do not doubt what is indubitable, i.e., the self-positing cogito. Yet I do not employ this, as it were, 'automatic' thesis, I make no use of it [...] Perhaps the immediacy of the givenness of the ego is a 'prejudice'; and self-experience, as well as object-experience has its a priori, which makes possible the appearing of the ego. (48)
Ultimately, Patocka argues for the primacy of the world as the "universal structure of appearance that cannot be reduced to a being as such, appearing in its particularity" (49). According to Patocka, just as objects are constituted, so too is the I, and the site of their appearance is the world.
Although concisely presented, Patocka's thoughts here are provocative and insightful. Those wishing to delve further into the ideas that Patocka presents in these two texts may consult the collection of texts published in German as Vom Erscheinen als solchem: Texte aus dem Nachlaß. We can only look forward to an eventual translation of these fascinating texts in the future.
The texts by contributors are then grouped according to four headings: "Asubjective Phenomenology," "The Three Movements of Human Existence," "Patockian Reflections on Modern Society," and "Patocka on Meaning." The contributors' text certainly fulfil the mandate of expioring the broad context of his work, with texts on topics as diverse as the philosophy of history, cosmology, Ancient Greek aesthetics, Dostoyevsky, and mathematics. What is perhaps misleading about the title is the suggestion that the contributors would explore Patocka's project of an asubjective phenomenology in the broader context of his work: of the twelve texts, only the two from the section "Asubjective Phenomenology" discuss this topic in depth, while the others rather deal with other aspects of his work without any real mention of asubjective phenomenology. As such, what we get are two source texts on Patocka's asubjective phenomenology, two articies discussing his asubjectve phenomenology plus ten more articles discussing other aspects of his work. Although it is a pity not to find an attempt to integrate Patocka's asubjective phenomenology into the broader context of his work, some of these other articles are excellent and do in fact explore some of the less frequently discussed sides of Patocka's thinking.
Of the articies from the first section, "Asubjective Phenomenology," Ivan CHVATiK'S article, "Patocka's Project of an Asubjective Phenomenology," does an excellent job of explaining the key claims of Patocka's critique in addition to situating this project within the historical development of Patocka's thought. Chvatik also provides relevant biographical information about Patocka's relationship with Husserl and situates Patocka's critique in relation to Heidegger's. This fine article ends with an interesting discussion of the problem of appearing in Plato's Theaetetus, thereby developing Patocka's suggestion that it is Plato who first raises awareness of this philosophical issue. Following Chvatik's article, Michael GUBSER undertakes the task of situating Patocka's asubjective phenomenology within his broader work, and in particular in its relation to his political thinking and eventual activism. Gubser does a solid job of tying together the many threads of Patocka's oeuvre, and his discussion of the idea of Europe in Patocka's thought is particularly insightful. Like Chvatik's article, Gubser's provides a wealth of historical information to situate the development of Patocka's thinking within its tumultuous historical circumstances.
These two articles do an excellent Job both of explaining Patocka's asubjective phenomenology and in linking it, in a general way, to other aspects of bis work. Perhaps the one piece missing here is an article exploring the relationship between Patocka's critique of Husserl and that of Heidegger. The characterisation of Heidegger given by Gubser, for example, is that he "turned away from human worldliness in the quest for the authenticity of anxious solitude, rejecting others as the anonymous 'they' and retreating from the social world" (74). This, however, is clearly referring to the early Heidegger, and Patocka's 'break' with Heidegger becomes much less clear in relation to the later Heidegger. Although it is clear from the texts of Patocka contained in this volume that he does break with Heidegger's later thought, a full article outlining precisely how would have been valuable here.
Of the remaining ten articles, the ones which stand out in particular are Josef Moural's article, "Phenomenology, History, and Responsibility for One's Life," Ivan Chvatik's second article "Patocka's Philosophy of Meaning in Human Life and History," and Anita William's article, "Ihe Meaning of the Mathematical." MOURAL'S article deftly traces the roots of Patocka's conceptions of history and responsibility in Husserl. His article is also notable for offering a refreshingly critical perspective on Patocka's own thought. CHVATIK'S second article deals with Patocka's immensely interesting discussion of Dostoyevsky in a late text. This article is particularly good in its presentation of the significance of religion in Patocka's thought. Finally, WILLIAMS' article deals with an often overlooked element of Patocka's work; his discussion of mathematics, in particular from his seminar Plato and Europe. Williams provides a fascinating discussion of Patocka's relationship to Jacob Klein and is particularly clear in situating Patocka in relationship to Husserl and Heidegger.
Taken in conjunction with the rest of the articles, what we are presented with in this volume is a remarkably broad overview of Patocka's work. Although it could be said that there is not as much discussion of asubjective phenomenology as one would hope for, this volume neverthe1ess does a great service to Patocka scholarship in English by providing much-needed translations and a broad selection of articles which covers the essential aspects of Patocka's thought.
Daniel LEUFER
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