

Lubica Učník, Ivan Chvatík, Anita Williams (eds.)
Asubjective Phenomenology

Edited by
Hans Rainer Sepp

Editorial Board

Suzi Adams · Adelaide | Babette Babich · New York | Kimberly Baltzer-Jaray · Waterloo, Ontario | Damir Barbarić · Zagreb | Marcus Brainard · London | Martin Cajthaml · Olomouc | Mauro Carbone · Lyon | Chan Fai Cheung · Hong Kong | Cristian Ciocan · București | Ion Copoeru · Cluj-Napoca | Renato Cristin · Trieste | Riccardo Dottori · Roma | Eddo Evink · Groningen | Matthias Flatscher · Wien | Dimitri Ginev · Sofia | Jean-Christophe Goddard · Toulouse | Andrzej Gniazdowski · Warszawa | Ludger Hagedorn · Wien | Terri J. Hennings · Freiburg | Seongha Hong · Jeollabukdo | Edmundo Johnson · Santiago de Chile | René Kaufmann · Dresden | Vakhtang Kebuladze · Kyjiw | Dean Komel · Ljubljana | Pavlos Kontos · Patras | Kwok-ying Lau · Hong Kong | Mette Lebeck · Maynooth | Nam-In Lee · Seoul | Monika Małek · Wrocław | Balázs Mezei · Budapest | Viktor Molchanov · Moskwa | Liangkang Ni · Guangzhou | Cathrin Nielsen · Frankfurt am Main | Ashraf Noor · Jerusalem | Karel Novotný · Praha | Luis Román Rabanaque · Buenos Aires | Gian Maria Raimondi · Pisa | Rosemary Rizo-Patrón de Lerner · Lima | Kiyoshi Sakai · Tokyo | Javier San Martín · Madrid | Alexander Schnell · Paris | Marcia Schuback · Stockholm | Agustín Serrano de Haro · Madrid | Tatiana Shchytsova · Vilnius | Olga Shparaga · Minsk | Michael Staudigl · Wien | Georg Stenger · Wien | Silvia Stoller · Wien | Ananta Sukla · Cuttack | Toru Tani · Kyoto | Detlef Thiel · Wiesbaden | Lubica Ucnik · Perth | Pol Vandavelde · Milwaukee | Chung-chi Yu · Kaohsiung | Antonio Zirion · México City – Morelia.

The *libri nigri* series will be edited at the Central-European Institute of Philosophy, Prague.
www.sif-praha.cz

Asubjective Phenomenology:
Jan Patočka's Project
in the Broader Context of his Work

Edited by

Ľubica Učník

Ivan Chvatík

Anita Williams

Verlag Traugott Bautz GmbH

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek

Die deutsche Bibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation
in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie.
Detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet abrufbar über
<http://dnb.ddb.de>

This book is supported by
The Australian Research Council
as part of the Discovery Project entitled
*Judgment, Responsibility, and the Life-World:
The Phenomenological Critique of Formalism.*

Verlag Traugott Bautz GmbH
D-99734 Nordhausen 2015

Gedruckt auf säurefreiem, alterungsbeständigem Papier
Alle Rechte vorbehalten
Printed in Germany

ISBN 978-3-88309-993-4

In memory of Jan Patočka (1907–1977)

Contents

Jan Patočka's Project of an Asubjective Phenomenology, and the Movement of Human Existence..... 1
Lubica Učník, Anita Williams, Ivan Chvatík

Part I: Jan Patočka

Husserl's Subjectivism and the Call for an Asubjective Phenomenology..... 17
Jan Patočka

Epochē and Reduction: Some Observations 41
Jan Patočka

Part II: Asubjective Phenomenology

Patočka's Project of an Asubjective Phenomenology 55
Ivan Chvatík

Jan Patočka's Transcendence to the World 71
Michael Gubser

Part III: The Three Movements of Human Existence

Phenomenology, History, and Responsibility for One's Life..... 99
Josef Moural

A World of Possibilities: The Cosmological World and the Movement of Existence in Jan Patočka..... 115
Inês Pereira Rodrigues

Autonomy and Phenomenology: Patočka's Approach..... 127
Émilie Tardivel

Part IV: Patočkian Reflections on Modern Society

Three Perspectives on Politics and History: Patočka, Hayek and French Positivism 145

Ciaran Summerton

The Problem of Meaning in the Rational (Super)Civilisation: Patočka's Interpretation of Modernity after World War II 167

Jakub Homolka

Life, Technology, Christianity: Patočka's Sacrifice for Nothing and its Economic-Mythical Roots 187

Riccardo Paparusso

Patočka's Observations on the Meaning of Beauty in Ancient Greece..... 199

Anthony Backhouse

Part V: Patočka on Meaning

Patočka's Philosophy of Meaning in Human Life and History 213

Ivan Chvatík

The Meaning of the Mathematical 227

Anita Williams

Movement and Human Existence: The Mysterium of Mundanity..... 253

Ľubica Učník

Notes on Contributors

Jan Patočka's Life and Work 275

Contributors..... 277

***Index* 280**

Acknowledgments

The editors thank the authors of this volume for their contributions, including their commitment to preparing and editing their respective entries. We gratefully acknowledge the support of the Australian Research Council (ARC) for the 2010–12 research project, *Judgment, Responsibility and the Life-World* (which has been led by Lubica Učník). We have also benefited from the support of Murdoch University, Australia; the Jan Patočka Archives at the Center for Theoretical Study at Charles University in Prague, and the Institute of Philosophy at the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic; and University College Dublin, Ireland. In particular, we would like to express our gratitude to Matt Bower and Kenneth Maly for their work on the translations of Jan Patočka's papers for this book; Darja Zoubková and Hana Matysková from the secretariat of the Center for Theoretical Study in Prague, for organising workshops as part of the ARC grant; and, finally, to Urszula Dawkins for her patience with copyediting the manuscripts.

Jan Patočka's Project of an Asubjective Phenomenology, and the Movement of Human Existence

Lubica Učník, Anita Williams, Ivan Chvatík

Phenomenology is a mode of philosophising that does not take ready-made theses for its premises but rather keeps all premises at an arm's length. It turns from sclerotic theses to the living well-spring of experience. Its opposite is metaphysics – which constructs philosophy as a special scientific system. Phenomenology examines the experiential content of such theses; in every abstract thought it seeks to uncover what is hidden in it, how we arrive at it, what seen and lived reality underlies it. We are uncovering something that has been here all along, something we had sensed, glimpsed from the corner of our eye but did not fully know, something that 'had not been brought to conception.' *Phenomenon* – that which presents itself; *logos* – meaningful discourse. Only by speaking it out do we know something fully, only what we speak out do we fully see. That is what makes phenomenology so persuasive.¹

Jan Patočka, a Czech philosopher and phenomenologist, travelled to Freiburg in 1933 to study with Edmund Husserl and his research assistant Eugen Fink – Patočka was to be the last student of Husserl. His doctoral thesis (1931)² had been a historical exploration of the concept of evidence, leading to the reappraisal of Husserl's concept.³ His habilitation (1936) focused on another concept of Husserl: the natural world⁴ (based on Avenarius' terminology, from his book, *Der Menschliche Weltbegriff*,⁵ where he formulates the term "der natürliche Welt-

¹ Patočka, *Body, Community, Language, World* (Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1998), 3–4, emphasis in original.

² Patočka, "Pojem evidence a jeho význam pro noetiku [The Concept of Evidence and its Significance for Noetics]", *Fenomenologické spisy I: Přirozený svět. Texty z let 1931–1949* (Prague: Oikoymenh, Filosofia, 2008 [1931]), 14–125.

³ See Učník, "Jan Patočka: From the Concept of Evidence to the Natural World and Beyond", eds Učník, Chvatík and Williams, *The Phenomenological Critique of Mathematization and the Question of Responsibility: Formalisation and the Life-World* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014).

⁴ Patočka, "Přirozený svět jako filosofický problém [The Natural World as a Philosophical Problem]", *Fenomenologické spisy I: Přirozený svět. Texty z let 1931–1949* (Prague: Oikoymenh, Filosofia, 2008 [1936]), 127–260.

⁵ Avenarius, *Der Menschliche Weltbegriff [The Human Concept of the World]* (Leipzig: O. R. Reisland, 1891).

begriff – the natural concept of the world”⁶). Patočka went to Freiburg ostensibly to attend Heidegger’s lecture course, as stipulated by his Humboldt scholarship; Husserl and Heidegger had a lasting influence on his thinking. From this time on, he attempted to rethink both master phenomenologists. Misleadingly, this influence is sometimes (by superficial readers) reduced to the question: ‘Who was the final influence? Is he a ‘Heideggerian’ or does he remain a ‘Husserlian’? As with many such speculations, some claim that Patočka has overcome Husserl’s Cartesianism; others maintain that he has always remained faithful to Husserl.⁷ Not surprisingly, Patočka’s work can be seen as giving some support to both of these interpretations. Here, we will posit that Patočka’s lifelong pursuit of both these thinkers leads him to rethink the phenomenological project by offering a reconceptualisation of *sum*, ‘I am’, as the movement of human existence, later expanded as the three movements of existence; leading him to conceptualise his asubjective phenomenology, which is neither Husserlian nor Heideggerian, but indebted to both while also transgressing the thinking of both. In other words, he remains faithful neither to Husserl nor Heidegger, but to phenomenology.

Patočka’s project is a struggle between rejecting the transcendental *ego* as the explanatory ground of meaning constitution, and retaining the subject – but not as the last ground from which the world is constituted, rather as a real living being who is open to the world. Patočka’s rethinking is marked by unrelenting returns to Husserl and Heidegger and their phenomenological projects. Perhaps it could be said that Patočka attempts to rethink phenomenology as the study of manifestation, which was, he claims, Husserl’s original project. In “What is Phenomenology?”, Patočka proposes to recover Husserl’s maxim to return to ‘things themselves’,⁸ but in a way that overcomes the Cartesian remnants that led Husserl to his transcendental phenomenology.⁹

⁶ See Chvatík, “Patočkova kritika pojmu ‘přirozený svět’ [Patočka’s Critique of the Concept of ‘Natural World’]”, eds Velický et al., *Spor o přirozený svět* (Prague: Filosofia, 2010), 55–68, 56.

⁷ For further discussion, see Michael Gubser’s contribution to this volume.

⁸ Patočka, “Co je fenomenologie? [What is Phenomenology?]”, *Fenomenologické spisy II: Co je existence. Publikované texty z let 1965–1977* (Prague: Oikoymenh, Filosofia, 2009 [1979]), 497–523, 499: “Předložený pokus však chce především sloužit k obnovení maximy ‘k věcem samým.’”

⁹ For the “concepts of phenomenology” and “Husserl’s maxim ‘going back to the things themselves’, which Heidegger changed slightly to ‘to the things themselves’”, see Herrmann, “Introduction”, trans. Maly, *Hermeneutics and Reflection: Heidegger and*

In his “Afterword” to Husserl’s translation of the *Cartesian Meditations*, Patočka notes that Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is the study of reduced phenomena, which amounts to the study of the world as the pure phenomenon of consciousness.¹⁰ The main problem of Husserl’s approach, as Patočka identifies it, is the idea of phenomenological reduction, derived from Cartesian methodical scepticism.¹¹ In this way, the transcendental field of appearances becomes the structure of the individual *ego*, seemingly turned upon itself, an abstraction, eliminating fundamental layers of experience. The road to the transcendental field as given in the fifth *Meditation* attempts to incorporate, by very complicated procedure, other *egos*, in Husserl’s formulation of intersubjectivity. The Cartesian remnants obscure the original Husserlian project, whereby Husserl does not point to the certainty, as Descartes does, but to the *meaning* of what is revealed to us.¹² And this insight of Patočka’s is important. Husserl shows that we are given a ‘thing’ in different modes of appearing. As is typical of Patočka, he shows the historical trajectory of the constitution of meaning, starting (in this instance) with Plato’s *Letter Seven*, which he claims is the first philosophical reflection on the constitution of meaning. He also claims that Plato influenced the whole tradition by obscuring the field of manifestation – which he in fact discovered – by skipping over it directly to the revealed thing in its presence.¹³ Patočka never became tired of repeating that in the modern analysis

Husserl on the Concept of Phenomenology (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), 5–9, 5.

¹⁰ Patočka, “Husserlova fenomenologie, fenomenologická filosofie a ‘Kartéziánske meditace’ [Husserl’s Phenomenology, Phenomenological Philosophy and ‘Cartesian Meditations’]”, *Fenomenologické spisy II: Co je existence. Publikované texty z let 1965–1977* (Prague: Oikoymenh, Filosofia, 2009 [1968]), 238–364, 248.

¹¹ See also the translation in this volume, originally published in Czech as Patočka, “Epoché a redukce: Několik poznámek [Epoché and Reduction: Some Observations]”, eds Kouba and Švec, *Fenomenologické spisy II* (Prague: Oikoymenh, 2009 [1975]), 442–452.

¹² Patočka, “Husserlova fenomenologie, fenomenologická filosofie a ‘Kartéziánske meditace’ [Husserl’s Phenomenology, Phenomenological Philosophy and ‘Cartesian Meditations’]”, 250.

¹³ See, for example, Patočka, “Negative Platonism: Reflections Concerning the Rise, the Scope, and the Demise of Metaphysics – and Whether Philosophy Can Survive It”. edited and translated by Kohák. *Jan Patočka: Philosophy and Selected Writings* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1989 [circa 1955]), 175–206; Patočka, *Úvod do fenomenologické filosofie [Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy]* (Prague: Oikoymenh, 1993), especially Patočka, *Platónova péče o duši a spravedlivý stát: Přednášky k antické filosofii IV [Plato’s Care for the Soul and the Just State: Lectures on Ancient*

of the constitution of meaning, the phenomenal field – when reduced to the structure of the subject only – simply means that the thingness of things (*res extensa*) is constituted by another thing: *res cogitans*.¹⁴

According to Patočka, in his “*pensée, cogitatio*” Descartes discovers the “phenomenal field” (as Patočka terms it): “what Descartes means here, is nothing other than that where what appears is appearing”.¹⁵ And this field is reduced to the structure of subjectivity, which Descartes immediately abandons, aiming at the certainty of *res extensa*. He discovers *sum*, I am, only to skip over it: in the subsequent tradition, *sum* is simply forgotten. For Patočka, the remainder is simply “a permanent, essential attribute of a thing, which I am”, reduced to something that can persist through time, “as long as I am I”, which is “taken as my determination”, as “the certainty of my being”. Furthermore, it is “what I must suppose as unmistakable and immediately present in all dealings with things, whether the said things are or are not, whether they actually have or do not have this or that determination”.¹⁶ The subject, reduced to ‘thingness’ is the remnant of Descartes’ splitting of the world into two substances. In the last instance, Cartesian doubt gives me certainty that in my *cogitatio*, I have secured the object, which is my own thinking.¹⁷

Philosophy IV], Sebrané spisy Jana Patočky. Svazek 14/4 (Prague: Oikoymenh, Filosofia, 2012). Also see the translation of Patočka’s “Husserl’s Subjectivism and the Call for an A-Subjective Phenomenology” in this volume.

¹⁴ Patočka, “Husserlova fenomenologie, fenomenologická filosofie a ‘Kartéziánske meditace’ [Husserl’s Phenomenology, Phenomenological Philosophy and ‘Cartesian Meditations’]”, 252.

¹⁵ Patočka, “Subjektivismus Husserlovy fenomenologie a možnost ‘asubjektivní fenomenologie [The Subjectivism of Husserl’s Phenomenology and the Possibility of an ‘Asubjective’ Phenomenology]”, trans. German, *Fenomenologické spisy II: Co je existence. Publikované texty z let 1965–1977* (Prague: Oikoymenh, Filosofia, 2009 [1970]), 379–396, 383: “Co zde Descartovi tane na mysli, není nic jiného než to, v čem se jevíci zjevuje, fenomenální pole.”

¹⁶ Ibid.: “Co tedy zůstane jako stálý, podstatný atribut věci, kterou jsem, může být jen něco, co lze kdykoli, dokud já jsem já, pojmut jako mé určení, a to v jistotě mého bytí. Toto určení ale nebude nic jiného než to, co musím předpokládat jako neklamně a bezprostředně přítomné v každém zabývání se s věcmi, ať už dotyčné věci jsou nebo nejsou, ať už ta a ta určení skutečně mají nebo nemají.”

¹⁷ Patočka, *Úvod do fenomenologické filosofie [Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy]*, 56.

Patočka writes, in *Úvod do Fenomenologické Filosofie* [*Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy*], that this Cartesianism is the legacy of Brentano.¹⁸ Husserl's phenomenology is timid: his *epoché* stops short of the sphere of subjectivity, as the sphere where meaning is being constituted, without asking how it is possible that the object – which I am reflecting on in the immanence of subjectivity – exists in its 'fullness'; in other words, stands against me as such. Husserl's supposition is that the transcendental subject has a noetic/noematic structure. For Husserl, this structure of the transcendental subject is simply given and never investigated.¹⁹

Yet, what makes phenomenology important, according to Patočka, is its changed focus. Instead of studying the internal structure and lawfulness of objects, it concentrates on manifestation on the side of immanence; in other words, within the structure of subjectivity.²⁰ For Patočka, Heidegger's move is to reject the immanent structure of consciousness derived from the 'gaze' turned inward – the postulate of the disinterested observer – instead proposing a different structure: he concentrates on the structure of *sum* – the relationship to the world.²¹ Yet, as Patočka asks, is the analysis of *sum* the best starting point to be able to 'see' the problem of understanding and truth?²² For Patočka, despite the attempt to avoid subjectivism, this position remains liable to it. Similar to Husserl's reduction of the open sphere of manifestation – a sphere of possibility in which the world and the subject could meet – to the structure of subjectivity, Heidegger's structure of human experience is still explained "as a *ground*...rather than that which is *grounded on* the original event of the openness of time".²³

In our opinion, the philosophy of Heidegger created the most important prerequisites for the formation of entirely new phenomenology, mainly because he revealed unexamined ontological presuppositions of Husserl's phenomenology. However, because Heidegger's own philosophy embarked on the path to discuss the topic of 'revealing as such' exclusively in connection with the problem of Being, Husserl's problematic, since then, was never revisited. Yet, the appraisal of Husserl's phenom-

¹⁸ Ibid., 84.

¹⁹ Ibid., 73.

²⁰ Ibid., 77.

²¹ Ibid., 107–108.

²² Ibid., 124.

²³ Patočka, "Husserlova transcendentální filosofie po revizi [*Husserl's Transcendental Philosophy after Revision*]", 1969. See Chvatík, "Patočka's Project of an Asubjective Phenomenology", in this volume.

enology does not seem to be settled and overcome. On the contrary, a new formulation of problems could cause Husserl's phenomenology to deepen.²⁴

All his life, Patočka circled around the question of what phenomenology is and how it can illuminate our everyday world; how it can clarify our presuppositions, to which we have become blind. His fight was to overcome the positivism of the modern age. In "What is Phenomenology?", Patočka notes that we should take up and follow the work of Husserl and Heidegger by critically reflecting on the heritage of phenomenology, which was approached differently by these two thinkers. For Patočka, Husserl's phenomenology is defined by his never-ending struggle against psychologism²⁵: Husserl's attempt is to clarify the problems of the subjective life, aiming towards universality of sense and meaning.²⁶ Heidegger, according to Patočka, takes up Husserl's project but changes it utilising Søren Kierkegaard's attempt to account for our human existence. Kierkegaard thinks the truth of human existence as being different from the objective truth, while Heidegger shifts Kierkegaard's ontic focus from concrete human existence, to rethink it as an ontological problem. Heidegger, on the model of Husserl's phenomenological reduction, thinks human existence as transcending all beings, as the ontological truth, as the space that allows *pragmata*, things we use, to unproblematically appear. The structure of human existence, *Dasein* (*pobyt*, as Patočka translates it), gives us an access to Being that is never manifested, as such, but lets all other beings manifest themselves. Humans are concerned about their own being, hence, they are the only ones who can understand Being. For Heidegger, the issue is not humans' private existence, but their concern with Being.²⁷ Seemingly, Husserl's and Heidegger's conceptions are so different that reconciliation is impossible. Patočka attempts to see what unites – despite common opinion to the contrary – Husserl's and Heidegger's phenomenology. As Patočka says, it would be bad for phenomenology if we could not bridge their different phenomenological methods and find the ground that nour-

²⁴ Patočka, "Subjektivismus Husserlovy fenomenologie a možnost 'asubjektivní' fenomenologie [The Subjectivism of Husserl's Phenomenology and the Possibility of an 'Asubjective' Phenomenology]", 380.

²⁵ For a similar claim, see Crowell, "Does the Husserl/Heidegger Feud Rest on a Mistake? An Essay on Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology", *Husserl Studies* 18.2 (2002).

²⁶ Patočka, *Věčnost a dějinnost: Rádlův poměr k pojetím člověka v minulosti a současnosti* [Eternity and Historicity: Rádl's Relation to Past and Present Conceptions of Man], Edice Oikúmené (Prague: Oikoymenh, 2007), 64.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 74.

ishes them both. The only way is to go back to things themselves and search for the motives that led both thinkers in their respective quests. The aim is not to construct some new, eclectic mix, but to see what is common in their different approaches by critically reflecting on their work.²⁸ As noted above, Patočka's answer lies in the movement of human existence, which he extends to his analysis of the three movements of existence and into his asubjective phenomenology.

These themes are addressed in the contributions to this volume, which are tied together not only by their focus on Patočka, but also by their demonstration of his commitment to phenomenology and his drive to overcome what he understands as Husserl's and Heidegger's subjectivism." According to Patočka, Husserl's subjectivism stems from his making the world secondary to the subject who constitutes the meaning of things; while Heidegger's subjectivism results from making the disclosure of the world dependent on *Dasein*. For Patočka, Husserl's and Heidegger's respective subjectivisms cast a shadow over what Patočka thinks is phenomenology's most important contribution to modern thought: the revisiting of the problem of manifestation.

The volume is divided into five parts. Part I contains translations of two of Patočka's works. In Part II, Ivan Chvatík and Michael Gubser discuss Patočka's asubjective phenomenology. In Part III, Josef Moural, Inês Pereira Rodrigues and Émilie Tardivel engage with Patočka's three movements of existence. In Part IV, Ciaran Summerton, Jakub Homolka, Riccardo Paparusso and Anthony Backhouse present Patočkian reflections on issues facing modern society. In Part V, Chvatík, Anita Williams and Lubica Učník tie together Patočka's work to show that human meaning, which is often effaced by modern mathematical science, is the central concern of Patočka's work.

²⁸ Patočka, "Co je fenomenologie? [What is Phenomenology?]", trans. Dimter, *Idea fenomenologie a dva texty Jana Patočky k problému fenomenologie* (Prague: Oikoymenh, 2001), 78–102, 79: "S věcí fenomenologie by to bylo zlé, kdyby se nemělo podařit překlenout protiklady dvou základních fenomenologických doktrín tak, aby se odkryl základ jejich difference, a to fenomenologicky, ve věcech samých, a pokud by o sporných bodech nemohla rozhodnout věc sama. K tomu musí být u obou myslitelů vyhledány motivy, které vykazují společné rysy; je třeba se pokusit vypracovat to, co je za jejich protikladem a co je sjednocuje. Tento jednotící moment nemá vest k eklekticismu, nýbrž má sloužit právě k tomu, aby bylo možné k oběma naukám zaujmout kritický postoj."

Part I: Jan Patočka

Part I starts where Patočka's work ends: with his asubjective phenomenology. Following a brief biographical note, this section begins with the first English translation of Patočka's work entitled "Husserl's Subjectivism and the Call for an Asubjective Phenomenology". In this work, Patočka puts forward the case that Husserl's phenomenology offers a principled way to reflect upon the problem of manifestation; yet, instead of remaining with the problem of manifestation, Husserl's focus shifts to studying pure consciousness. For Patočka, studying 'pure consciousness' is impossible. Patočka's call for an asubjective phenomenology is a call for phenomenology to stay with the problem of manifestation.

Part I also contains the first English translation of "*Epoché* and Reduction: Some Observations". In this paper, Patočka questions the *epoché* and the reductions in Husserl's phenomenology. For Patočka, the *epoché* should be performed in a "wholly universal way": in other words, the *epoché* should not stop short of grasping the existence of the self, but should bring into question the thesis of the certainty of the individual ego. Patočka argues that if we were to do so, we could encounter "the condition of the possibility of the appearing of the self" as well as the appearing of things: we would be able to bring into view the problem of manifestation. This problem of manifestation becomes the central problem in Patočka's call for an asubjective phenomenology; hence, it is important that both papers be included in this volume, to be read alongside one another.

Part II: Asubjective Phenomenology

In Part II, Ivan Chvatík reviews Patočka's asubjective phenomenology, describing it as an attempt "to disengage philosophical thought from the vestiges of traditional Cartesian subjectivism". Husserl's project is an attempt to overcome Cartesianism and, hence, Chvatík points out that "neither Patočka nor Heidegger set out to refute Husserl's phenomenology"; instead, they wish "to identify the points in Husserl where he was – in good faith – unfaithful to his original project". To this end, Chvatík shows that Patočka's asubjective phenomenology pushes phenomenology to revisit the problem of manifestation; "to fully thematise what Husserl originally had in view, namely, how anything at all, *including ourselves*, appears". Chvatík argues that Patočka's asubjective phenomenology is a call to remember Husserl's original problem: the problem of manifestation, which is the central motif of his asubjective phenomenology.

Also in Part II, Michael Gubser puts forward a reading of Patočka's asubjective phenomenology which makes sense of his "public defence of Charter 77" in terms of 'human rights'. For Gubser, asubjective phenomenology is Patočka's attempt to incorporate Husserl's "*epoché* as an act of freedom" and Heidegger's being-in-the-world; while attempting to overcome the subjectivism he sees in both Husserl and Heidegger. Gubser argues that it is Patočka's commitment to human freedom, as well as to us as beings who are always engaged with our world, which explains his defence of human rights. Against the backdrop of modern mechanistic thought, which seemingly closes off the possibility of human freedom, Patočka ardently defends humans as free, as able to question and, therefore, also as able to transform the world in which they live.

Part II emphasises the themes that are relevant to Patočka's entire opus. Patočka's asubjective phenomenology, as well as his work more generally, engages with both Husserl's and Heidegger's phenomenologies, seeking to highlight points of compatibility as well as difference. Patočka extends the work of both thinkers to make an original contribution to phenomenology: a phenomenology that stays with the problem of manifestation.

Part III: The Three Movements of Human Existence

Part III presents reflections on Patočka's three movements of human existence, which show the relevance of Patočka's earlier work to his final proposal for an asubjective phenomenology. Josef Moural begins Part III, emphasising, like Gubser, the importance of responsibility for both Husserl's and Patočka's work. Moural's central argument is that responsibility is tied to the third movement of human existence, which is, in turn, tied to history. According to Moural, Patočka sees history as being important in its opening up of the possibility of the third movement: in other words, questioning, and rethinking accepted opinions and practices, requires history.

Inês Pereira Rodrigues also reflects upon Patočka's three movements of existence, but focuses on the importance of the world to Patočka's theory, explaining it as "a movement which, at bottom, *is* relation to the 'world as a whole'". Pereira Rodrigues carefully explicates Patočka's concept of 'world', showing its relationship to the three movements of existence and humans' responsibility for meaning.

Extending Gubser, Moural and Pereira Rodrigues, Émilie Tardivel focuses specifically on the importance of human autonomy for Patočka's three movements.

Tardivel's key focus is the human relation to the world: humans' role is neither to establish the world nor to constitute the world, but rather to reveal what is and make things explicit. Tardivel argues that Patočka acknowledges the role of humans in manifestation as well as the possibility of human freedom without "reducing the world to man". In Moural's, Pereira Rodrigues' and Tardivel's complementary accounts of Patočka's three movements of existence, we are shown three equally important aspects of Patočka's work as a whole; regarding history, the world, and human freedom and responsibility.

Part IV: Patočkian Reflections on Modern Society

Part IV shifts the focus of the volume to consider the relevance of Patočka's work, not only for philosophy, but also for understanding problems facing modern society. Ciaran Summerton opens Part IV by discussing Patočka's critique of modern technoscientific thinking and its relation to modern political thought, employing Patočka's three movements of human existence to both understand and critique the technoscientific character of modern politics.

Jakub Homolka shows that Patočka's concept of 'supercivilisation' provides a crucial insight about modern society; and argues that Patočka's considerations of 'supercivilisation' could be usefully adopted by modern sociology and, in particular, civilisational analysis. Riccardo Paparusso discusses Patočka's work on sacrifice in the technological age, referring to Patočka's notion of sacrifice for nothing. He argues that to sacrifice one's life is theoretically incomprehensible within the technoscientific age, because technoscientific conceptions of life emphasise vitality – the prolonging of bare life – without consideration of its meaningfulness or, consequently, its meaninglessness. However, he suggests that sacrifice for nothing offers "the possibility of salvation", because sacrifice for nothing reveals that life cannot be reduced to the mechanistic view.

Anthony Backhouse discusses Patočka's lecture on beauty and art. He explains that, for Patočka, beauty starts as a philosophical concept in Ancient Greece and "becomes 'narrow' and 'psychologised'" in contemporary society. In the context of this volume, his argument can be summarised in terms of beauty becoming a subjective concept in modern society; a concept relegated to art and removed from philosophical concerns.

Part V: Patočka on Meaning

Part V presents Patočka's work as a coherent body that brings into question the seemingly unstoppable application of modern science to understanding not only the physical world, but the human world as well. Patočka's guiding concern is for human meaning, which stands to be obliterated by the march of technoscientific thinking. Ivan Chvatík traces the problem of meaning throughout Patočka's oeuvre, up until his final work. Anita Williams draws upon Patočka's work to trace the meaning of mathematics, back to the Ancient Greeks. Williams argues that Patočka understands Plato's interest in geometry as stemming from Plato's realisation that things manifest on the basis of something other than themselves; hence, for Patočka, Plato's interest in geometry is ultimately connected to the problem of manifestation. Lubica Učník closes the volume by drawing together Patočka's proposal for an asubjective phenomenology and his three movements of human existence. She reads Patočka's work as a sustained questioning of modern mathematical science and a consistent attempt to understand the problem of meaning, which has been all but excluded from technoscientific concerns. Učník's analysis ends the volume where we began: with the idea that Patočka's central motif is rethinking the idea of subjectivity, without either reducing the world to the subject or eliminating the subject from the world.

Works Cited

- Avenarius, Richard. *Der Menschliche Weltbegriff [The Human Concept of the World]*. Leipzig: O. R. Reisland, 1891
- Chvatík, Ivan. "Patočkova kritika pojmu 'přirozený svět' [Patočka's Critique of the Concept of 'Natural World']." *Spor o přirozený svět*. Eds Bedřich Velický et al. Prague: Filosofia, 2010, 55–68
- Crowell, Steven Galt. "Does the Husserl/Heidegger Feud Rest on a Mistake? An Essay on Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology." *Husserl Studies*. 18.2 (2002), 123–140
- Herrmann, Friedrich-Wilhelm Von. "Introduction." Trans. Kenneth Maly. *Hermeneutics and Reflection: Heidegger and Husserl on the Concept of Phenomenology*. New Studies in Phenomenology and Hermeneutics. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013, 5–9
- Patočka, Jan. *Body, Community, Language, World*. Ed. James Dodd. Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1998
- Patočka, Jan. "Co je fenomenologie? [What is Phenomenology?]." *Fenomenologické spisy II: Co je existence. Publikované texty z let 1965–1977*. Prague: Oikoymenh, Filosofia, 2009 [1979], 497–523

- Patočka, Jan. "Co je fenomenologie? [What is Phenomenology?]." Trans. Tomáš Dimter. *Idea fenomenologie a dva texty Jana Patočky k problému fenomenologie*. Edice Oikúmené. Prague: Oikoymenh, 2001, 78–102
- Patočka, Jan. "Epoché a redukce: Několik poznámek [Epoché and Reduction: Some Observations]." *Fenomenologické spisy II*. Eds P. Kouba and O. Švec. Prague: Oikoymenh, 2009 [1975], 442–452
- Patočka, Jan. "Husserlova fenomenologie, fenomenologická filosofie a 'Kartéziánské meditace' [Husserl's Phenomenology, Phenomenological Philosophy and 'Cartesian Meditations']." *Fenomenologické spisy II: Co je existence. Publikované texty z let 1965–1977*. Sebrané spisy Jana Patočky. Svazek 7. Prague: Oikoymenh, Filosofia, 2009 [1968], 238–364
- Patočka, Jan. "Husserlova transcendentální filosofie po revizi [Husserl's Transcendental Philosophy after Revision]", *Archiv J. Patočky MS 1992/004*, 1969
- Patočka, Jan. "Negative Platonism: Reflections Concerning the Rise, the Scope, and the Demise of Metaphysics – and Whether Philosophy Can Survive It." Edited and translated by Erazim Kohák. *Jan Patočka: Philosophy and Selected Writings*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1989 [circa 1955], 175–206
- Patočka, Jan. *Platónova péče o duši a spravedlivý stát: Přednášky k antické filosofii IV [Plato's Care for the Soul and the Just State: Lectures on Ancient Philosophy IV]*. Ed. Jiří Polívka. Na ediční přípravě tohoto svazku se dále podíleli: Jan Frei, Ivan Chvatík, Pavel Kouba a Ladislava Švandová. Přednáškový cyklus ze školního roku 1971/72. Prague: Oikoymenh, Filosofia, 2012
- Patočka, Jan. "Pojem evidence a jeho význam pro noetiku [The Concept of Evidence and its Significance for Noetics]." *Fenomenologické spisy I: Přirozený svět. Texty z let 1931–1949*. Sebrané spisy Jana Patočky. Svazek 6. Prague: Oikoymenh, Filosofia, 2008 [1931], 14–125
- Patočka, Jan. "Přirozený svět jako filosofický problém [The Natural World as a Philosophical Problem]." *Fenomenologické spisy I: Přirozený svět. Texty z let 1931–1949*. Sebrané spisy Jana Patočky. Svazek 6. Prague: Oikoymenh, Filosofia, 2008 [1936], 127–260
- Patočka, Jan. "Subjektivismus Husserlovy fenomenologie a možnost 'asubjektivní' fenomenologie [The Subjectivism of Husserl's Phenomenology and the Possibility of an 'Asubjective' Phenomenology]." Trans. Jakub Capek from German. *Fenomenologické spisy II: Co je existence. Publikované texty z let 1965–1977*. Sebrané spisy Jana Patočky. Svazek 7. Prague: Oikoymenh, Filosofia, 2009 [1970], 379–396
- Patočka, Jan. Úvod do fenomenologické filosofie [Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy]. Prague: Oikoymenh, 1993
- Patočka, Jan. Věčnost a dějinnost: Rádlův poměr k pojetím člověka v minulosti a současnosti [Eternity and Historicity: Rádl's Relation to Past and Present Conceptions of Man]. Edice Oikúmené. 3 ed. Prague: Oikoymenh, 2007