

James Smith
Wert, Rechtheit and Gut

AD FONTES

STUDIES IN EARLY PHENOMENOLOGY

7

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James Smith

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*Dedicated to the memory of Dr Thomas A. F. Kelly,
who taught me what philosophy is and why it is so very important.*

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EDITORIAL NOTES AND ABBREVIATIONS

- S.W. *Sämtliche Werke*, a collection of Reinach's published and posthumous works edited by Barry Smith and Karl Schumann that appeared in 1989. Unless otherwise specified, this refers to volume I, 'Die Werke'.
- Grundbegriffe Reinach's 1906 paper 'Die Grundbegriffe der Ethik'.
- Überlegung Reinach's 1912/13 article 'Die Überlegung: ihre ethische und rechtliche Bedeutung'.
- Grundzüge 'Grundzüge der Ethik', an extract from Reinach's 1913 lecture course 'Einleitung in die Philosophie'.
- Grundlagen Reinach's 1913 monograph 'Die apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen Rechtes'.

This book contains references from sources in both English and German. Passages from the works abbreviated as 'Grundbegriffe', 'Grundzüge' and 'Überlegung' are cited from the indicated page in Lebeck and Smith, eds., *Adolf Reinach: Three Texts on Ethics* (Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 2017). Where other titles or quotations from German texts are given in English, I have cited a published translation if one is available. In other cases, the translation is my own.

Some passages quoted from the *Sämtliche Werke* contain notes inserted by the editors. Likewise, some quotations from existing translations contain notes inserted by the translator. For clarity, these notes have been maintained with the original square brackets, i.e. [], while my own editorial notes are indicated with braces, i.e. {}.

INTRODUCTION

*Whether there is objective knowledge of values
is perhaps the most important [question] in the world.*¹

From the beginning to the end of Adolf Reinach's philosophical career, the subject of ethics was a recurring theme in his thought. Yet, in his lifetime, Reinach never published a treatise solely on ethics at all; his published discussions of ethical questions all appeared in works primarily relating to the philosophy of law, and his lengthiest reflection on ethics formed part of a lecture course that he never prepared for publication. This does not mean that Reinach's writing on ethics was minor or unimportant, but, for many years after his death, his works were scattered and inaccessible, with some of the most substantial parts surviving only as transcripts recorded by Reinach's students during his lectures. Today, although Reinach's extant comments on ethics exist together in a published form, they are far from the best-known part of his body of work and are in fact somewhat overlooked.

The goal of this book is to investigate and evaluate Reinach's contributions to early phenomenological ethics. 'Early phenomenological ethics' here refers to a philosophical tradition of ethics that prevailed among the realist phenomenologists of the Munich and Göttingen circles in the early twentieth century, and one that is still relevant today. In the chapters that follow, we will explore the nature of Reinach's contributions in this field. Although Reinach was a pioneer in phenomenological value-theory, a common theme in early phenomenological approaches to ethics, his work goes much further, as Reinach attempts to address a wide range of problems. In doing so, he identifies three separate concepts in ethics: the concept of moral values (*sittliche Werte*), the concept of moral rightness (*sittliche Rechtheit*) and the concept of goods (*Guter*). Each of these concepts is apportioned its own ethical sphere, and each is capable of accounting for questions in ethics that the others cannot. In this way he reconciles non-formal values with formal duties, and these in turn with the hierarchical concerns of the good human life. He also explores contrasting ethical assessments, the nature of willing and motivation, the problem of freedom, and the boundaries between ethics and the philosophy of law. We will also show that Reinach's work had a

¹ Adolf Reinach, *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. by Karl Schumann and Barry Smith (Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 1989), vol. 1, p. 505, paragraph 1.

traceable influence in the development of phenomenological ethics by Dietrich von Hildebrand and Edith Stein, and that he at least anticipated (if not influenced) some of the ideas put forward by the most famous phenomenological ethicist of his lifetime, Max Scheler.

To borrow a distinction from Reinach's own work, however, there is a difference between the *goal* of an undertaking, that which one sets out to do, and the *purpose* for which the goal is pursued. Our goal of investigating Reinach's contribution to early phenomenological ethics is pursued for the broader purpose of encouraging and aiding future study of Reinach's work. This book is intended not as the last word on Reinach's ethics, but as one step towards a greater understanding and appreciation of that work.

REINACH'S LIFE AND LEGACY

As far back as our knowledge of his life goes,² Adolf Reinach was a man of diverse interests. The oldest of three siblings, he was born in Mainz in 1883, though his name is much more closely associated with Munich (where he carried out his undergraduate studies) and Göttingen.³ He belonged to 'a distinguished Jewish family ranking side by side with the patricians of Mainz';⁴ his father Wilhelm was a factory owner.⁵ He first came into contact with the world of philosophy through reading the works of Plato at grammar school, and developed an immediate attachment to the discipline that was to become the focus of his career; but this was no foregone conclusion.

² Karl Schumann and Barry Smith, writing in 1987, commented on a general lack of biographical work on Reinach: 'The few existing published biographies of Reinach are, if not unreliable (Oesterreicher 1952), then at best very succinct (Avé-Lallemant 1975, 172-74, Crosby 1983, XI-X)'. Schumann and Smith, 'Adolf Reinach: An Intellectual Biography', in Kevin Mulligan, ed., *Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology* (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), p. 1. Schumann and Smith later added another introduction to Reinach's life, in German, to the second volume of the S.W.

³ Reinach's younger brother Heinrich took up a legal career. He later served as Adolf's commanding officer during the First World War. Their sister, Pauline, entered a Benedictine convent in Belgium in 1924, wherein she remained until her death in 1977. See, Schumann and Smith, 'Adolf Reinach: An Intellectual Biography', p. 2.

⁴ John M. Oesterreicher, *Walls are Crumbling: Seven Jewish Philosophers Discover Christ* (New York: Devin-Adair, 1952), p. 101.

⁵ Schumann and Smith, 'Adolf Reinach: An Intellectual Biography', p. 2.

In his first year and a half at the University of Munich in 1901, 'he attended courses in a range of subjects, including political economy, art history and law'.⁶ The law, his brother Heinrich's chosen profession, was Reinach's other great passion, and remained a theme intertwined with his philosophy for the rest of his life. He also possessed a strong early interest in psychology, which likewise informed his choices of subject matter within philosophy and ultimately his move towards phenomenology.

Reinach's philosophical studies began in Munich under Theodor Lipps. He joined the *Akademische Verein für Psychologie* (Academic Society for Psychology), a weekly discussion group for Lipps's students to discuss psychology and philosophy,⁷ coming into contact with several other philosophers who would later join the phenomenological movement, most notably Johannes Daubert. At this early stage, Reinach reached the conclusion that he 'lack[ed] true sympathy and enthusiasm for the subject-matter' of psychology.⁸ At this point, it seems that Reinach's interest in the law took precedence over his other pursuits.

In 1904, at age 20, Reinach earned his doctorate in philosophy under Lipps.⁹ By the end of that year, he had read Husserl's *Logische Untersuchungen* twice over. Though many found the work difficult to understand, the ideas presented within it appear to have struck a chord with Reinach, and the experience convinced him to alter his plans for future study.¹⁰ The next year, he joined several other Munich philosophers in their 'invasion' of Göttingen.¹¹ His initial stay was enjoyable but short-lived; though he wanted to continue to study under Husserl, with whom he had already founded a personal friendship, he felt it necessary to first complete his degree in the law.

⁶ Ibid., p. 3.

⁷ Schumann and Smith, *Einleitung: Adolf Reinach*, S.W., p. 613.

⁸ Schumann and Smith, 'Adolf Reinach: An Intellectual Biography', p. 4.

⁹ His doctoral thesis, *Über den Ursachenbegriff im geltenden Strafrecht* (*On the Concept of Cause in the Present Criminal Law*), was published posthumously.

¹⁰ Husserl later wrote that 'Reinach belonged to the very first philosophers who fully understood the distinct character of the new phenomenological method' (Husserl, in 'Reinach as a Philosophical Personality', ed. by John F. Crosby, *Aletheia* 3 (1983), p. xi).

¹¹ Three other students from Munich, including Johannes Daubert, made this move around the same time as Reinach; Moritz Geiger, Theodor Conrad, Dietrich von Hildebrand and Hedwig Conrad-Martius followed in later years. (Herbert Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction*, 3rd edn (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), p. 169)

He returned to the University of Munich for two semesters, before moving on to Tübingen in the winter of 1906. It was here that he first met Anna Stettenheimer, a physicist from Stuttgart studying for her doctorate, who would later become his wife.

In 1909, with his legal studies behind him, Reinach completed a philosophical work entitled ‘Wesen und Systematik des Urteils’ (‘The Nature and Systematic Theory of Judgement’)¹² for a competition in Munich. When the competition was cancelled, Reinach began investigating the possibility of submitting it as a habilitation thesis. Lipps, however, had become ill and was not able to participate in this process. As a result, Reinach returned to Göttingen to attempt habilitation there, submitting ‘Wesen und Systematik des Urteils’ as his thesis. His application was accepted with Husserl’s support and in June of that year he completed the additional requirements to be admitted to the position of *Privatdozent*.

By 1913, when Edith Stein arrived in Göttingen, Reinach was already well established in his new position, being described as ‘Husserl’s right hand’.¹³ In 1910, Max Scheler, who was previously acquainted with Husserl and who believed the two shared an ‘intellectual bond’ that was ‘extraordinarily fruitful’,¹⁴ began to make appearances in Göttingen; ‘he made but little personal contact with Husserl, but all the more with his students’.¹⁵ He and Reinach, among others, worked side by side at this time on Husserl’s *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*.

In September 1912, Adolf Reinach and Anna Stettenheimer, now a doctor of physics, were married. Their life together was, however, to be short. ‘Like almost all German intellectuals of the time, Reinach was carried away by the enthusiasm which broke out after the declaration of war between Germany and the allied powers’.¹⁶ In August 1914, mere days after the declaration of war, Reinach volunteered for military service and was transferred

¹² For reasons unknown, plans to publish this work did not go ahead, and it was thought for many years to have been lost altogether (Schumann and Smith, ‘Adolf Reinach: An Intellectual Biography’, p. 15). At their time of writing, no surviving copies were known to exist, but a partial text was eventually recovered and published in the S.W.

¹³ Edith Stein, *Life in a Jewish Family*, trans. by Josephine Koeppl (Washington DC: ICS Publications, 1986), p. 247.

¹⁴ Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement*, p. 269.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Schumann and Smith, ‘Adolf Reinach: An Intellectual Biography’, p. 29.

to France in short order. He was assigned to a reserve artillery regiment, in which he served under the immediate command of his younger brother Heinrich. He was decorated for his service, receiving the Iron Cross after a fierce engagement in 1915. He described the experience of fighting as ‘often terrible’, and yet regarded his military service as ‘the proudest time of my life’.¹⁷ His experiences catalysed the development of his religious views; in 1915, he wrote to Anna and to Hildebrand to tell them about ‘a change to the very roots of [his] being’.¹⁸ While at the front he wrote his only surviving notes on the philosophy of religion. He also became intrigued by the idea of premonitions and the implications that they would hold for phenomenology if they could be proven to exist. At the same time, he began to express doubts in his correspondence that he would live to see the end of the war.¹⁹

While Reinach was on leave in 1916, he and Anna were formally baptised into the Protestant Church. He returned to the front, and was killed in action on November 16, 1917, aged 34. He was survived by his wife Anna, his brother Heinrich and his sister Pauline.²⁰

Although he published very little in his lifetime,²¹ Reinach’s lasting legacy was assured by his role in teaching the students of the Göttingen phenomenological circle. Roman Ingarden called him ‘the very heart of our collective efforts, the active spirit opening up new aspects and paths of investigation in a creative attitude which never rested’.²² Hildebrand wrote that ‘from 1910 on, [Reinach] was my only teacher’,²³ praising his influence over and above that of Scheler. In her autobiography, Edith Stein recalls, ‘The hours spent in [Reinach’s] beautiful study were the happiest of all my time in Göttingen. We [students] were unanimous in the opinion that, when it

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 31.

¹⁸ Oesterreicher, *Walls are Crumbling*, p. 122.

¹⁹ Schumann and Smith, ‘Adolf Reinach: An Intellectual Biography’, p. 30.

²⁰ Anna Reinach lived on in Germany until 1942, when she was forced to flee the country to avoid being arrested by the Nazi regime. She returned to Germany in 1950, where she died in 1953.

²¹ A detailed chronology of Reinach’s publications and *Nachlass* can be found in chapter one.

²² Ibid., p. 19.

²³ Taken from an introduction written for (but not published in) the compilation of Reinach’s *Gesammelte Schriften* in 1921. Published in ‘Reinach as a Philosophical Personality’, trans. by John F. Crosby, *Aletheia* 3 (1983), p. xx.

came to method, we learned more here than anywhere else'.²⁴ Reinach himself found this work exhausting, but rewarding.²⁵ In Stein's words, 'All these brilliant achievements were the result of unspeakable care and trouble'.²⁶ Spiegelberg concludes that 'it was [Reinach's] death in action in 1917 rather than Husserl's going to Freiburg which cut short [the promise] of the Göttingen phenomenological circle'.²⁷

ETHICS IN REINACH'S PHILOSOPHY

In chapter one, we will identify the parts of Reinach's surviving body of works that we consider to be dealing with ethics, in order to use them as key primary sources. Naturally, this requires us to make a judgement as to what 'ethics' means, so that these works can be distinguished from the rest of Reinach's writings. This does not mean that Reinach's works on subjects that we consider not to belong to ethics are irrelevant; they provide, rather, important context for our investigation. An understanding of Reinach's phenomenological method, the descriptive investigation of ethics, his theory of judgement and the *Sachverhalt* and his work on social acts are each necessary to appreciate Reinach's work on ethics, but in light of our present focus on ethics we will not explore these topics at length. As we review Reinach's primary works in chapter one, we will note key points for later reference in our discussions.

Reinach subscribed to a form of early, realist phenomenology inspired (in his case) by the philosophies of Theodor Lipps, Johannes Daubert, Alexander Pfänder and Edmund Husserl. We will discuss early phenomenology in detail in chapter two, but for the purposes of context it is important to note that all of Reinach's philosophical projects, including his ethics, aspire to the description of essences given in experience. When Reinach sets out to investigate what he sees as the questions of ethics, he is not aiming to produce a concise and self-contained ethical calculus or a set of imperatives; his project is to describe the ethical as completely and as faithfully as possible, with nothing left out for the sake of neatness.

We base our understanding of ethics here broadly on the sense in which Reinach also used it, to describe a field within philosophy that is concerned

²⁴ Stein, *Life in a Jewish Family*, p. 274.

²⁵ Oesterreicher, *Walls are Crumbling*, p. 101.

²⁶ Stein, *Life in a Jewish Family*, p. 274.

²⁷ Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement*, p. 192.

with universal, *a priori* normative questions (‘What ought I to do?’, ‘What ought to be?’), and their answers. Even here, though, our language is ambiguous without clarification. The challenge of rendering our discussion of Reinach’s ethics in English without losing the nuances of the original German text only adds to the difficulties here.

Reinach does not draw any kind of clear distinction between the meanings of the words ‘ethics’ (*Ethik*) and ‘morals’ (*Sitten*), or between ‘ethical’ (*ethisch*) and ‘moral’ (*sittlich*). He is consistent in referring to the field or exercise of studying ethics and morals as ‘ethics,’ and to this field belongs the study of moral values (*sittliche Werte*). Although Reinach also sometimes refers to ethical values (*ethische Werte*) with apparently the exact same meaning as moral values, it would be accurate to express the distinction as follows: Reinach is interested in the *study of ethics*, which is *concerned with the moral*. But what Reinach calls the ‘concept of the moral’,²⁸ moral value, does not satisfy all of the questions of ethics. Specifically, it satisfies the question ‘what is good?’ but not the question ‘what ought to be?’ This latter question requires a second basic concept in ethics, that of moral rightness, to be satisfied. Reinach also refers to a third basic concept, that of goods (*Güter*). We will discuss in detail what these three concepts and their respective spheres (*Sphären*) mean in chapter three; for now it is sufficient to be clear that as far as Reinach is concerned, they are necessary — and at least provisionally sufficient — to describe the essence of the ethical, the ‘things themselves’ of ethics, in the way called for by his phenomenological method.

Reinach associates ethics directly with normative statements, with the concept of ‘ought’ (*Sollen*). He does not consider psychological egoism and hedonism to be compatible with ‘ethics in the customary sense’,²⁹ because those theories consider human action to be necessarily governed by selfish or hedonistic desires; they do not allow any claims about what ought to be. Ethics, then, is normative by definition.

However, concern with the concept of ought is not exclusive to ethics either. Legal enactments also take the form ‘ought’ and express norms, prescriptions and prohibitions for human action; yet Reinach separates the ethical from the legal as distinct areas of investigation.³⁰ Ethics, then, is more

²⁸ Grundbegriffe, trans. by Lebeck and Smith, p. 37; S.W. p. 335, paragraph 3.

²⁹ Grundzüge, trans. by Lebeck and Smith, p. 189; S.W. p. 487, paragraph 2.

³⁰ For example, in ‘Die Überlegung: ihre ethische und rechtliche Bedeutung’, Reinach considers the significance of reflection in ethical and legal contexts under separate headings.

specifically concerned with oughts that are absolute or universal, deriving from formal moral laws and their relationship to non-formal values. Ethical norms are *a priori* and categorical, while legal norms are *a posteriori* and hypothetical; in other words, ethics is the same for everyone, while each positive law is unique and specific to a certain jurisdiction. Finally, the positive law is purely formal, while ethics is also concerned with non-formal values that are all that can convey the moral good in concrete situations. The positive law recognises goods in the sense of Reinach's third concept of ethics, but without the objectively ranked importance that Reinach attributes to them within that ethical sphere.

Likewise, Reinach's work on ethics must be briefly distinguished from his theory of the social acts. Although the theory of social acts deals with the concepts of promises and obligations, it does so from the point of view of fact, not that of normativity. There is certainly a relationship between the essential obligation to fulfil a promise and the moral obligation to do so, but these obligations are not identical and it is crucially important not to conflate them. The social acts as a whole are 'non-ethical categories',³¹ and although they have a certain relationship with ethics, they do not belong to ethics. We will discuss this relationship further in chapter three.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONCEPT OF 'CONTRIBUTION'

We have emphasised that our goal in this investigation is to identify Reinach's *contribution* to early phenomenological ethics. In the chapters that follow we will discuss what we mean by several of these key terms. Yet the task itself might seem strangely specific; why be concerned with Reinach's 'contribution' at all, rather than simply with Reinach's 'ethics'?

The core reason for this is that Reinach did not produce an ethics, not in the sense of a complete or systematic theory. It would be misleading to describe what we are investigating in those terms. Given Reinach's body of surviving works, the question of what he contributed in the development of a phenomenological ethics is a more productive one. But beyond that, the idea of a contribution also has a particular importance in the context of the early phenomenological movement. There was a shared attitude characteristic of the Göttingen and Munich phenomenologists towards scholarship and

³¹ Armin Burkhardt, 'Verpflichtung und Verbindlichkeit. Ethische Aspekte in der Rechtsphilosophie Adolf Reinachs', in Mulligan, ed., *Speech Act and Sachverhalt*, p. 156.

the purpose of their work that shifted emphasis away from the achievements of the individual. In the words of Herbert Spiegelberg,

The shortness of his life was not the only reason for the torso of Reinach's philosophy. Like all the other early phenomenologists he firmly believed in philosophy as a cooperative scientific enterprise to which each researcher would have to contribute patiently and unhurriedly, much in the way as it is the case in the sciences. There could be no such thing as a one-man system.³²

We see this attitude reflected especially in the case of Johannes Daubert, a hugely influential figure in the formation of the Munich and Göttingen circles of the phenomenologists who yet 'did not publish a single word during his time with either [the Munich or Göttingen] circle,'³³ and in the works of Edith Stein, whose work often covered gaps in the phenomenological investigations made by her colleagues.³⁴ The early phenomenologists were making what they saw as a rigorous, scientific analysis of real objects given in phenomena, so the discussions and conclusions of any one member of the movement were open to usage — and correction — by all others. In such an environment, a phenomenologist could focus not on rushing towards the final completion of an over-arching theory, but on the careful and complete investigation of one problem at a time.

This suggests that Reinach's writings on ethics were not necessarily intended as the beginnings of an ethical theory, or even the groundwork or foundation for one. Each question Reinach raised and addressed in his works

³² Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement*, pp. 192-3.

³³ Kimberly Baltzer-Jaray, *Doorway to the World of Essences: Adolf Reinach* (Saarbrücken: Verlag Dr. Müller, 2009), pp. 119-120. In a footnote, Jaray gives another explanation for this phenomenon, one also applicable to Reinach:

'The reason Daubert never published a word, why his manuscripts for both *Festschrift* and *Jahrbuch* were never completed, can be ascertained from letters between Husserl and Daubert. Daubert, like Reinach, was a perfectionist where his work was concerned and overly self-critical. Smid calls Daubert "phenomenology's Socrates," since he stimulated the work of other students, but never formulated a corpus of published work himself'. *Ibid.*, p. 120, n. 46.

³⁴ In editing Husserl's manuscripts for the second and third volumes of *Ideen*, Stein saw Husserl 'struggle with issues she thought she had resolved, without his being willing to revisit her contribution'. Mette Lebeck, 'Why Do We need the Philosophy of Edith Stein?', in *Communio*, vol. xxxviii, no. 4 (Winter 2011), p. 695.

was an addition to the body of phenomenological philosophy, a contribution towards the development of a project that was bigger than any one thinker. The fact, therefore, that Reinach produced only a contribution and not a full ethics is not in any way a mark of failure on his part.

METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE

The question at hand — expressed in its simplest form as, ‘What was Adolf Reinach’s contribution to early phenomenological ethics?’ — is not one that can be answered simply or briefly. For our conclusions on this question to be comprehensible and supportable, we must first consider carefully what the question itself means. We must answer the questions that this main question raises in turn: Which of Reinach’s works have to do with ethics? What is the context in which we intend to consider his work as a contribution? What, in fact, do we mean when we refer to a contribution? These questions, in turn, generate questions of their own, and it is around this growing list of questions that the course of this investigation can be formed.

The answering of these many questions requires a careful reading and interpretation of the primary source material that makes up Reinach’s work on ethics. In the face of the comparative lack of secondary literature dealing with the present subject, the importance of this study of the primary sources is greater still. In light of this, great care must be taken in the interpretation of the original text and in representing that text faithfully while discussing it in English. For this, it is helpful to consult and compare existing English-language translations alongside the original German text, as the translators’ own notes on terminology and rendering of terms, are of significant value in the accurate interpretation of the texts themselves.

The process of establishing the context or background for assessing Reinach’s contributions to early phenomenological ethics depends upon both textual evidence on one hand, and historical and biographical evidence on the other. To draw a connection between two texts requires that something of one text be recognisable in the other, but as the early phenomenologists were not in the habit of making direct textual references, we must often rely on biographical sources and personal correspondence simply to tell us which works a particular philosopher had read. Despite their overall lack of philosophical content, these sources thus provide important context for our investigation.

This book is presented in four chapters. These chapters are arranged in order to lay out the content, context, nature and extent of Reinach's contribution to early phenomenological ethics, thus supporting a final assessment of that contribution in the light of all relevant factors. It is to be hoped that the introductory and contextual material will also help to make Reinach's philosophy accessible to scholarship in general.

One of the difficulties facing our investigation is that, as noted above, Reinach's thoughts and positions regarding ethics are not to be found together in a single treatise, but are instead distributed through a number of works and lectures. Chapter one begins to address this issue by reviewing the key sources for the investigation in the context of Reinach's body of work. The first section of the chapter lays out a chronology of Reinach's surviving writings, highlighting particular works that deal specifically with ethics. The second section looks more closely at those particular works, outlining their content for later reference. The final section looks at certain secondary sources that contain discussion or commentary on Reinach's ethics, particularly in terms of assessing Reinach's work as a contribution.

We have also noted that a contribution cannot really be assessed without considering the context in which it was made. Chapter two explores this context by identifying and profiling key figures who form part of the philosophical background to the development of Reinach's ethics or to that of early phenomenological ethics generally. This also involves a discussion of where 'early phenomenology' originated and what it is understood to mean. The ideas introduced in this chapter are helpful in understanding Reinach's works on ethics, and so have been placed before the discussion of those works. However, the content of this chapter is most important for the later assessment of Reinach's contribution; it serves to establish what Reinach was contributing to with his writings.

Chapter three presents an in-depth critical discussion of Reinach's work on ethics, showing in detail what is to be found in the primary sources identified in chapter one. This chapter lays out the content of Reinach's contribution to early phenomenological ethics, and analyses the positions taken by Reinach in relation to ethics. Of particular significance is Reinach's division of ethics, as noted above, into three separate spheres (*Sphären*),³⁵ correlating to three separate basic concepts in ethics: the concept of moral value, the concept of moral rightness, and the concept of goods.

³⁵ Grundzüge, p. 209; S.W. p. 492, paragraph 4.

Finally, chapter four explores the key issue of contribution by discussing three main themes: the originality of Reinach's work on ethics, the distinctness of his work from that of his key contemporaries, and his demonstrable influence on other members of the phenomenological movement in their discussions of ethics. This chapter draws on the conclusions of all of the previous chapters in order to establish the ways in which Reinach's work on ethics can be considered a contribution, both within its specific context and generally.