

Eddo Evink
Transcendence and Inscription

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Transcendence and Inscription

Jacques Derrida on
Ethics, Religion and Metaphysics

Translated by Shailoh Phillips and Martijn Buijs

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Table of Contents

Introduction	9
1. HIGH-FLOWN AMBITIONS – ON METAPHYSICS, TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY, PRETENSIONS AND LIMITATIONS	13
1.1 Classical metaphysics	14
1.1.1 The classic metaphysical intention	14
1.1.2 Hubris	17
1.1.3 Augustine and Thomas Aquinas	21
1.1.4 Kant and Hegel	22
1.2 Nietzsche’s radical critique of metaphysics	27
1.3 Phenomenology and philosophies of difference	34
1.3.1 Heidegger	34
1.3.2 Levinas	44
1.4 Religiously inspired critique of metaphysics	49
1.4.1 Reformational Philosophy	50
1.4.2 Duintjer	54
1.5 What is metaphysics? Or: the inevitability of hubris	58
2. ICARUS’ WAX – DERRIDA’S QUASI-TRANSCENDENTAL (CRITIQUE OF) METAPHYSICS	63
2.1 Metaphysics, logocentrism, phonocentrism	65
2.2 Writing, trace, play	69
2.3 Original supplement	75
2.4 Deconstruction	81
2.5 Quasi-transcendental differences	86
2.6 At the limit of metaphysics	96
2.6.1 The “closure” of metaphysics	96
2.6.2 Beyond “Kant vs. Hegel”	98
2.6.3 Beyond “Heidegger vs. Levinas”	101
2.6.4 The community of the question	104
2.6.5 Derrida and the classic metaphysical intention	108

3. ETHICS IN DECONSTRUCTION	116
3.1 The ethical dimension in Derrida's work	116
3.2 Law and justice	119
3.3 Laws and justice	125
3.4 Responsibility and decision	133
3.5 Gift and economy	143
3.5.1 Giving	143
3.5.2 Forgiveness	149
3.5.3 Hospitality	152
3.6 Politics in deconstruction	155
3.6.1 Between legacy and eschaton	155
3.6.2 The coming democracy, a community without community	160
3.6.3 Messianic Marxism	168
3.6.4 Enlightened European openness	174
4. FAITH IN DECONSTRUCTION	179
4.1 The name of confusion	182
4.2 Negative theology – Approaching God	185
4.2.1 Negative theology as language	186
4.2.2 Promise	189
4.2.3 Prayer	193
4.2.4 Secret	197
4.2.5 Place	201
4.3 Universal apophatics	205
4.3.1 Every other is wholly other	205
4.3.2 Revelation and revealability	208
4.3.3 The messianic	212
4.3.4 Khôra	215
4.4 Faith, politics, rationality	219
4.4.1 Politics and religion	220
4.4.2 Faith and reason	223
4.5 Ethics, sacrifice, economy	229
4.5.1 Religion and responsibility	229
4.5.2 Binding Isaac: sacrifice and economy	235
4.5.3 God sees into the invisible: sacrifice and economy	240
4.6 A “Jewish” philosophy	243

5. DAEDALUS' WINGS – QUASI-TRANSCENDENTAL CRITIQUE, METAPHYSICS AND HUBRIS	254
5.1 Derrida's critics	256
5.1.1 Habermas	256
5.1.2 Gadamer	259
5.1.3 Searle and Graff	266
5.2 Quasi-transcendental metaphysics	271
5.2.1 Derrida's metaphysics...	271
5.2.2 ...as testimony	277
5.3 Quasi-transcendental metaphysics and ethics	282
5.3.1 Ethics and ethnicity	282
5.3.2 Accountability	289
5.3.3 Counter-productive consequences	294
5.3.4 From infinite to finite responsibility	298
5.4 Quasi-transcendental metaphysics and religion	304
5.4.1 Religion, rationality and pluralism	304
5.4.2 "Jewish" philosophy and its alternatives	308
5.5 Icarus and Daedalus – finitude and potential of philosophy	312
Bibliodiscography	315
Abbreviations	315
Works by Jacques Derrida	316
Interviews and debates	321
Other cited works	322

Introduction

In October 2004 Jacques Derrida died at the age of 74. His work and his philosophical legacy, however, have lost nothing of their relevance and actuality. One might even say that it is alive and kicking. This book offers a survey of many aspects of Derrida's work, mainly focusing on the significance of his thoughts for the domains of ethics, politics and religion. The main thesis of this study is that the key to a fruitful evaluation of the strong and weak points of his work can be found in its ambiguous relation to the metaphysical tradition. Usually Derrida's ideas, and deconstruction as it is practiced and manifested by many others, are seen as a critique of metaphysics. This is true, but it is also just one side of the matter. In many cases, especially in by far the most of Derrida's texts, deconstructions are as well a continuation and even an affirmation of metaphysics. In order to understand, what exactly this means, the concept of metaphysics and its history need to be analyzed.

The first chapter of this book consists in an historical overview of the several meanings of the concept of metaphysics. It will be shown that in the history of metaphysics and of its criticism several aspects of this concept can be distinguished, and that all have their roots in what I call "the classic metaphysical intention". From the pre-Socratics through Hegel the classic metaphysical intention has dominated the philosophical tradition. It contains four major elements. In the course of modernity this metaphysical tradition has been critiqued in different ways, such that the diverse criticisms have focused on different elements of the classic metaphysical intention. As a result, several concepts of metaphysics have been developed, and different critics of metaphysics can "accuse" each other of "still being metaphysical".

Central to the classic metaphysical intention is the effort to find a complete and absolute "perspective" of everything, a so called God's eye view. This tendency is the, perhaps unavoidable, but also problematic, "hubris" of metaphysics.

Another feature that is highlighted in this history of the concept of metaphysics is the role of the notions of "transcendence" and "the transcendental". The search for transcendental conditions of the limits and possibilities of metaphysics has been a continuous source of its criticism, while at the

same time it can be seen as a prolongation of the metaphysical project and the metaphysical intention.

In chapter 2 the main features of Derrida's philosophy will be discussed, with special attention to its inheritance of the different facets of the tradition of metaphysics. On the one hand Derrida problematizes the metaphysical tradition as well as its transcendental criticism. He develops his own version of the concept of difference, *la différance*, making it a "quasi-concept" that works as a "quasi-transcendental" condition of (im)possibility. On the other hand this chapter shows how exactly this strategy bears in itself features of the metaphysical tradition. The two sides of Derrida's work, its criticism and its prolonging of this tradition, are examined under the headings of "inscription" and "transcendence".

Chapters 3 and 4 elaborate on this interpretation of Derrida's philosophy, by discussing respectively its ethical, political and religious relevance. Many sides of his thought will be reviewed, with special consideration of the metaphysical tendencies that are at work in Derrida's texts. This specific perspective shows that, despite the consistency in Derrida's entire oeuvre, a difference can be discerned between the earlier and the later work, due to a change of emphasis from inscription to transcendence.

Finally, chapter 5 offers a detailed evaluation of both the convincing and the weak elements of Derrida's philosophy. It will be shown that the metaphysical side of his ideas are directly related to the problematic aspects of his work in the fields of ethics and religion. Despite his continuous critique of metaphysical ways of thought, and despite the deconstructions of metaphysical constructions, Derrida's own style of thinking and writing is still driven by a metaphysical desire that includes a "hubris of metaphysics".

A first version of this book was published in Dutch in 2002. I want to thank Shailoh Phillips and Martijn Buijs for their accurate translation and comments. In addition I thank Matthijs Ruiter for his careful and precise corrections of the references and other details of this text. Both before and after the translation the text has been revised. The main thesis and structure of the book have remained the same, but quite a lot of details have been changed. Due to the fact only a few books on Derrida had been published in Dutch at the time, this book has partly been written as an introduction to general aspects of Derrida's work and to his views on ethics and religion. Discussion with other interpreters of Derrida's work can mainly be found in the footnotes.

I hope this new English version will be fruitful for everyone who is studying and acting in the traces of Derrida's legacy.

Amsterdam, July 2018

CHAPTER 1

High-flown ambitions – on metaphysics, transcendental philosophy, pretensions and limitations

*“I want to fly like an eagle to the sea
Fly like an eagle, let my spirit carry me
I want to fly like an eagle ‘til I’m free
Fly through the revolution”*

Steve Miller Band
Fly like an eagle

What is metaphysics? Metaphysics is disputable. It is a branch of philosophy that has repeatedly been shrugged off as backwards nonsense, or burnt at the stake, but just as often has risen as a Phoenix from the ashes. Even the attempt at defining “metaphysics” is already contentious. Throughout the course of history, conceptions of metaphysics have shifted to such an extent that the meaning of the term has also undergone various changes. Metaphysics cannot be captured in a single definition. So many conceptions and motifs in the metaphysical tradition are interwoven or contradictory, with such abundance and diversity that it is scarcely possible to speak of “metaphysics” as a comprehensive term. Anyone who attempts to forge the disparate elements into a unified totality undoubtedly commits an act of violence towards the diversity – and this is actually precisely an allegation attributed to metaphysics. A certain amount of violence is however indispensable, for a discussion of metaphysics cannot escape from pointing out several traits that remain constant throughout all the difference and alterations. It is possible to provide a short sketch of metaphysics by skimming over a few highlights in its historical development.¹ However, such a historical introduction far exceeds the confines of this chapter. Therefore I will restrict myself to a systematic distinction between various conceptions of metaphysics, an in-

¹ Such an approach can be found in the lemma “Metaphysik”, in: J. Ritter, K. Gründer (hrsg.), *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, Basel: Schwabe, 1971-2007, V, 1186-1279: 1186 (L. Oeing-Hanhoff).

terpretation or reconstruction that will set out a few main pathways, mercilessly bulldozing a myriad of nuances and tangents for the sake of providing some clarity.

This chapter will show that the basic traits of metaphysics that originated in ancient Greece, remained intact for centuries. Certainly, “metaphysics” took on many different shapes over the course of these centuries, and yet all these forms of metaphysics are an elaboration of a common goal or intention: they are on a quest for rational comprehension of the fundamental nature of reality. The various elements distinguishable within this common denominator can all be qualified as the *classic metaphysical intention*. The classic metaphysical intention dominated the history of philosophy from the onset until after Hegel.²

This metaphysical tradition has been critiqued in many ways. This chapter distinguishes three forms of critique: the religiously inspired critique, the transcendental critique and the genealogical critique. Each of these critiques will be evaluated, assessing to what extent they actually depart from the metaphysical tradition. Another chain of thought in all these distinctions is linked by the question concerning the pretensions and limits of the metaphysical intention, as well as exploring its alternatives.

1.1 Classical metaphysics

1.1.1 The classic metaphysical intention

In its classical form the metaphysical intention is marked by four interrelated core elements:

1. First is the central role of rational thinking, reasoning and argumentation. Comprehension of reality is no longer, or at least not primarily, sought by means of the myths and religion handed down through generations, but instead with *logos* (*ratio*, *Vernunft*, reason) that attempts to reveal the coherence of reality. Metaphysics emerges in the movement from *mythos* to *logos*. Reason is deemed the only reliable way to

² The distinction between metaphysical intention and metaphysical forms derives from the Dutch philosopher Herman Berger, although I employ these terms differently here. Cf. *Vragen naar zin. Een nieuwe inleiding in de metafysiek*, Tilburg: Tilburg University Press, 1986.

obtain true knowledge. In this way Plato, following Parmenides, makes a distinction between true rational knowledge (*epistèmè*) and fallible opinions (*doxai*).

2. This use of reason implies the assumption that reality is intrinsically organized according to rational principles. *Logos* and reality are identical, and thinking is the same as being. Parmenides already formulated this thesis of identity: “thought and being are the same”.³ Later this was explicitly elaborated by Leibniz as the “principle of reason” or the “principal of sufficient reason”: *nihil est sine ratio* (nothing is without reason).⁴
3. The knowledge sought after is encompassing and absolute knowledge of all reality. Put in Aristotelian terms: metaphysics investigates being as being. It is an attempt to map all the characteristics of being as such. Metaphysics is ontology.
4. Moreover, metaphysics attempts to understand the determining principle of reality: its origin, purpose, center, foundation, etc. In Aristotelian terms: metaphysics is aimed at the highest being, the prime mover, the ultimate directive cause. Sometimes the principle even reaches above and beyond being, towards the divine. Metaphysics hereby gains divine pretensions. Metaphysics is theology.

These elements are no more than a systematic elaboration of the previously given description of the aims of metaphysics, as the quest for rational comprehension of the fundamental nature of reality. Their interrelation is quite obvious: anyone who seeks rational understanding of reality assumes that it actually adheres to a rational structure, with a generally surveyable unity, and arranged according to a centrally organized principle. Although the third and

³ This translation of the fragment “το γὰρ αὐτό νοεῖν ἐστὶν τε καὶ εἶναι”, is controversial. Diels, for example, translates this phrase as “for the same is thinking and being (*denn dasselbe ist Denken und Sein*)”. Hermann Diels, Walther Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, Berlin: Weidmann, 1951 (1974), I, fr. 28B3. The translation “For the same thing is there both to be thought of and to be”, can be found in G.S. Kirk, J.E. Raven and M. Schofield, *The Presocratic Philosophers. A Critical History with a Selection of Texts*, 2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983 1990, fr. 292, p. 246n2.

⁴ Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Monadologie*, Hartmut Hecht (hrsg.), Stuttgart: Reclam, 1998, § 29-37, pp. 67-70; idem, *Vernunftprinzipien der Natur und der Gnade; Principes de la Nature et de la Grace fondés en Raison*, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1982, § 7-8, pp. 12-15.

fourth elements are extensions of the same train of thought, for Aristotle, they are also singled out in his *Metaphysics*. In modern metaphysics it becomes clearer that ontology is primary to theology, for example, in Wolff's subdivisions in *metaphysica generalis* (ontology) and *metaphysica specialis* (psychology, theology and cosmology). In Hegel's philosophy, which in many ways can be seen as the termination, highlight and completion of classical metaphysics, ontology and theology coincide in the development of the Absolute Spirit. Hence Heidegger later typifies Hegel's metaphysics as *onto-theology*.

The metaphysician yearns to ascend to great heights, to fly high enough to gain a bird's eye view of the entire world. But no matter how high she tries to fly, a *God's-eye view* is never within reach. Vision is always limited by a horizon. The metaphysical intention will always remain just this: an intention. Despite the sometimes far-reaching pretensions that metaphysicians entertain, they are also aware of the finitude and limitations of their thought. The ultimate aim of obtaining comprehensive and absolute knowledge will never be fully attainable. Therefore metaphysical intention is often described as a desire, frequently admitting – sometimes between the lines – that this desire will never be fully fulfilled. Often metaphysical desire is taken to simply be a fact of nature. The classical expression of this can be found in the opening sentence of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*: “All people by nature desire to know”. In Plato's *Symposium*, this assumption is formulated in terms of the *eros* of philosophy, which is called the highest desire. The search for the true comprehension of reality also has an emancipatory quality. In the dimness of ignorance it is the pursuit of the radiant enlightenment of true knowledge, a quest that is represented in archetypical form at the beginning of Parmenides' didactic poem and in Plato's allegory of the cave. Intention, desire, and liberation: classical metaphysics is an endless endeavor, striving to reach an unattainable goal, an ideal of true knowledge of a universe in which everything necessarily falls into place and all problems can be solved. However, the finitude of each metaphysical figure and the unappeasable desire indicate that there “is” always something that cannot be understood by reason, something *else*, which eludes all metaphysical comprehension.

The metaphysical ideal is also a normative ideal. It is not only a quest for how reality *is* in the most profound sense, but also how everyday reality *should be*. The metaphysical intention always has an ethical dimension. It is not only after true knowledge, but also aspires to a close-knit foundation for

ethics. Such a foundation can however by no means be found in the classical metaphysics of Antiquity. Ancient ethics entails far more a case for and an elaboration of a practical reason, which is distinct from a metaphysical rationality: virtues instead of foundations, *phronesis* instead of *epistèmè*. In the work of classical metaphysical thinkers such as Plato and Aristotle there are also elements to be found that cannot be reduced to the metaphysical intention. How does this practical reason relate to the “other” of metaphysics, which serves to constantly uphold the metaphysical desire? This is one of the questions that will be addressed in the discussion of Derrida’s relation to the metaphysical tradition.

1.1.2 Hubris

A notable trait of the metaphysical intention is formed by its far-reaching pretensions, which are reflected in all aspects, but especially in the fourth element, in which metaphysics attempts to think the divine. Here a question arises – and will remain pervasive for the remainder of this book – whether philosophical thought is not too demanding of itself in this regard. Is metaphysics not overly audacious in the attempt to think all of reality, including the divine? Does this not constitute an act of *hubris*, as was so often warned against in ancient Greece, when on the verge of transgressing the limits of humanity? Before providing a provisional answer to this question, let us first look at just how audacious antique metaphysics actually is, to ascertain to what heights they attempted to ascend.

From the start, philosophy set high expectations to thought, and these expectations only increased over the course of Antiquity. Heraclitus and Parmenides made a clear distinction between their own thought as opposed to the ignorance of others. The way in which Heraclitus tries to distinguish himself from “the masses” lacking his insight is remarkably pretentious, as articulated in many fragments. Heraclitus is perpetually astounded by the observation that most people are either unable or unwilling to see the inner unity within the constantly changing reality.⁵ Philosophical insight is elevated far above this misconception. Other thinkers and poets also score quite low in Heraclitus’ esteem. This is why Diogenes Laertius calls him the

⁵ G.S. Kirk, J.E. Raven and M. Schofield, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, fragments 194; 195; 209.

most conceited of all men, someone who looked down on everything.⁶ Parmenides is similarly opposed to the misconceptions of ordinary mortals. He clearly opposes the path of true knowledge that the goddess *Dikè* points out to him, to the aimless paths of double-minded, deaf and blind mortals who are bumbling about haphazardly.⁷ But do these pretensions of the new rational way of understanding reality – the pathway taken in the transition from mythos to logos – provide sufficient ground to condemn it as an act of hubris? Is the path of Heraclitus and Parmenides more audacious than their mythical predecessors, such as Hesiod, who describes the origin and development of several generations of gods? Is the haughtiness in this attempt due to the all-encompassing vision of the cosmos, or to the fact that this is not based on a mythical story, but using rational comprehension? Let us again postpone answering these questions, and first investigate further developments in the metaphysical tradition.

Regarding the spectrum of their thought, Heraclitus and Parmenides are still marked by certain measure of modesty. They mainly limit themselves to the observation that a deeper reality is hidden behind the surface of changing appearances. Besides this, Plato also aims at revealing the essence of the real truth, otherwise concealed by appearances. Moreover, Aristotle tries to explain things by investigating their causes. Furthermore there is a shift in the meaning of the term *logos*. For Heraclitus, *logos* entails cautiously mapping out the hidden coherence, and some also take this to entail the laws at work in reality itself, forming the unity of contradictory parts,

⁶ G.S. Kirk, J.E. Raven and M. Schofield, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, fragment 190; Diogenes Laërtius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, London: William Heinemann, 1925, 408-409.

⁷ G.S. Kirk, J.E. Raven and M. Schofield, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, fragment 288. Klaus Held writes in *Treffpunkt Platon*, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1990, 45: “Unverkennbar tritt Parmenides mit einem außerordentlich hoch gesteckten Anspruch auf. Das erinnert an seinen großen Zeitgenossen Heraklit aus Ephesus”. The critical distinction between their own rational philosophical thought as opposed to non-philosophical thinking for Held is the central argument posited by both Heraclites and Parmenides, see Held, *Heraklit, Parmenides und der Anfang von Philosophie und Wissenschaft. Eine phänomenologische Besinnung*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1980, 130-131, 469.

the measure for the changes, and attributing a place to things.⁸ For Aristotle there is a more constitutive connotation, in which thought determines being in a more autonomous sense. The pretensions of reason have clearly increased here.

Moreover, there is heightened competition between deity and philosophical thought. The order that Heraclitus attributes to the dynamic harmony of contrasting elements may, in his opinion, never be disregarded. And this also applies to the boundary between gods and humanity. *Hubris* occurs whenever someone flouts the strictures imposed by the gods by trying to efface or transgress this limit and enter divine territory; according to Heraclitus, such hubris must be combated.⁹ Plato, however, contends that philosophical thought should actually go beyond this limit. In order to break free from this mundane and inhibited existence, the philosopher must elude transience and gain immortality, hereby obtaining the status of a deity:

Evils [...] hover around the mortal nature and this earthly sphere. Therefore we ought to fly away from earth to heaven as quickly as we can; this ascent means to become like God, as far as this is possible; and to become like him, is to become holy, just and wise.¹⁰

Here thinking ascends to tremendous heights. It develops the divine part of the soul, the *nous*, rendering it immortal. True self-knowledge is here no longer the Delphic oracle, stipulating: “know thyself, know that you are not a god but a mortal”. Instead, according to Plato and his teacher Socrates, true self-knowledge recognizes and develops the divine, which resides in one’s own soul.¹¹

Aristotle adopts a similar point of view. He quotes the poet Simonides of Ceos, who claims that only God holds the privilege to constant divine knowledge; it does not suit human beings to strive for knowledge above and beyond their scale and scope. If Simonides is right, the gods are jealous, and they will certainly demonstrate this in regard to the knowledge sought after

⁸ The second version can be found in G.S. Kirk, J.E. Raven and M. Schofield, *The Presocratic Philosophers*. 187-188; cf. Klaus Held, *Treffpunkt Platon*, 37, and more extensively in Held, *Heraklit, Parmenides*, 174-195.

⁹ G.S. Kirk, J.E. Raven and M. Schofield, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, fragment 248: “Insolence [hubris] is more to be extinguished than a conflagration”. Repeatedly Heraclitus emphasizes the difference between mortals and gods: fr. 228, p. 191.

¹⁰ Plato, *Theaetetus* 176a-b; cf. *Timaeus* 90a-d; *The Republic* 518e.

¹¹ Jean-Pierre Vernant, *Mythe et religion en Grèce ancienne*, Paris: Seuil, 1987, 113.

in metaphysics, to the demise of whoever tries to overextend their reach. However, Aristotle interjects, the divine cannot be jealous, and poets do not always speak the truth.¹² Human intellect, the *nous*, which Aristotle also called the “mind’s eye of the soul”, acts in relation to the divine “as the eyes of nocturnal animals, as bats in the blaze of the day”, and yet it remains the divine in the human.¹³ For human beings, striving to obtain this divine knowledge is therefore certainly not excessively ambitious. On the contrary, Aristotle states in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the intellectual contemplation of first principles is the activity in which the highest form of human happiness is to be found, and it also endears us to the gods. This is why it is the noblest desire and we should not waste our thoughts on human and ephemeral trivialities, but instead, as much as possible, make ourselves immortal by thinking the divine.¹⁴

Thinking the divine, becoming equal to the gods and obtaining immortality – are the wings of philosophical thought not ascending to perilous heights here? Doesn’t Plato expect too much of human comprehension, when he himself indicates that it is difficult to look into a fire without hurting one’s eyes, and then still contends that whoever departs from the cave will finally see the sun with his very own eyes? Is the coherence of his lofty reasoning not doomed to melt in proximity to the unbearable heat of the sunrays? According to the standards set by the oracle of Delphi, this clearly constitutes hubris. But what can be said regarding the standards themselves? How should the hubris of metaphysics be evaluated? Should it be condemned as an evil transgression of the obvious limits of human nature? Or celebrated as a rational and critical alternative to myth and religion? Can the hubris of metaphysics only be exchanged for the hubris of a religious belief, which also grasps for the divine, assuming to possess the principle truth in terms of a divine revelation, and then in turn sets a limit to the critical thinking and questioning of metaphysics? Or can the limits and possibilities of

¹² Aristotle, *Metaphysics* A2, 982b25-983a10. The argument that gods cannot be jealous, indicates that Aristotle had quite a different image of god than the gods of the Greek myths. Jealousy is a recurrent trait which gods repeatedly display in these mythical accounts.

¹³ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* α1, 993b9-11.

¹⁴ Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, X, 7, 1177a11-1178a8; X, 8, 1178b8-1179a32. Even clearer is the praise for the divine intellect and the divine nature of philosophy as expressed in the opening lines of *On the Cosmos* 1, 391a1-b8; it is a matter of dispute whether this text should be ascribed to Aristotle.

metaphysics also be explored through a philosophical investigation and subjected to critique within philosophy? Is it correct to pose these questions in terms of an either-or dilemma? To what extent is there a choice at hand?

1.1.3 Augustine and Thomas Aquinas

In the Christian philosophy of late Antiquity and the Middle Ages, the hubris of philosophical thought is brought to bay, to a certain extent. Doubt is especially cast on the first element of the classic metaphysical intention: the primacy of reason. Philosophy no longer is taken to replace faith, instead works to serve belief. Believing and thinking, theology and philosophy do not stand in opposition, they are complementary. Faith seeks expression in terms of rational comprehension (*credo ut intelligam, fides quaerens intellectum*) and philosophy is the court and servant of theology (*ancilla theologiae*). Philosophy no longer aims at knowledge for its own sake. For Augustine, philosophy, just as all other things, is not directed at itself but aims at a higher goal: all things are placed in service of God. And everything that distracts people from this is wrong. Science and philosophy are geared towards knowing God, or, to be more precise, to self-knowledge in relation to knowledge of the divine Origin. The metaphysical desire for the selfless reflection of *theoria* is interchanged for a religious desire for the divine. The desire for knowledge for the sake of knowledge, and not directed towards God, hence is a deviation from the right path; it is a dangerous *curiositas*, curiosity.¹⁵ Augustine therefore condemns metaphysical desire to the extent that it is incorrectly oriented, thereby becoming a form of *hubris*.

Thomas Aquinas connects this critique with a Christian metaphysics closely related to Aristotle's work. Just as Aristotle he learns that all things that are, are directed at the good, that is, their own realization and completion. Because the intellect is the most striking feature of human beings, the use of the intellect, striving for knowledge, is by nature good. After all it is directed at the realization of what makes people human in the first place. The final aim, towards which human beings are directed, is to know and love God. Only to the extent that the philosophical desire for knowledge does not serve this last aim, is it to be condemned as *curiositas*. Thomas hence situates the critique of an inwardly directed metaphysical desire in a Christian-Aristotelian metaphysical framework. The wrong curiosity here is

¹⁵ Augustine, *Confessions*, I, I, 1; XXXV, 54, 55, 57.

mainly contemptible as it is deficiently metaphysical: there is insufficient inquiry regarding the causes. The metaphysical knowledge sought after must be supplemented with faith based on divine revelation.¹⁶ The restrictions set on philosophical ability to obtain knowledge are set by embedding philosophy within faith and theology, which are in turn strongly influenced by the metaphysical tradition. As there is not so much critique as relativization of the central role of rationality, the Christian philosophy in Antiquity and the Middle Ages can be counted as classical metaphysics.

1.1.4 Kant and Hegel

*"I told you that we can fly
Because we all have wings
But some of us don't know why"*

INXS

Never tear us apart

Immanuel Kant also attempted to moderate the high expectations of metaphysics. He does this not by subordinating thought to faith and revelation, on the contrary, reason is to him the only and favored way to obtain true and reliable knowledge. His critique of metaphysics takes on the shape of a self-critique of reason, in which reason itself must delineate its own borders. Although Kant is extremely critical of the metaphysical figures preceding him, he does foster a heartfelt appreciation for the metaphysical intention. He deems metaphysics to be the "favorite child" of reason, as an investigation that we are naturally inclined to seek out. It is not optional to practice metaphysics, but wells up as an innate urge, as natural as breathing.¹⁷

However this natural urge itself leads to nothing. Metaphysics, according to Kant, is a battlefield of endless controversies that cannot be solved by

¹⁶ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* II-II, qu. 166-167. The limits of metaphysical knowledge are, in reaction to Thomas, set more clearly by Duns Scotus and the subsequent schools of thought in voluntarism and nominalism; there is thus repeated demand in the metaphysical tradition for characterization of the "other" of metaphysics, for what goes beyond and transcends philosophical thought.

¹⁷ Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können* (1783), *Werkausgabe in 12 Bänden*, Wilhelm Weischedel (hrsg.), Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968, V, 109-264: A 168-169, 192.