Peter McCormick
Blindly Seeing

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For Juliette, Xavier, and Guillaume
who "see differently"

Blindsight

"Absence of visual awareness despite the presence of visual capacity . . . Philosophical interest arises because the phenomenon casts doubt on the relation usually assumed between consciousness and perception."

– *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*

Contents

Preface

In January 2015, while finishing major revisions on the essays in ethics collected here, I was, like many others in Paris, an indirect witness on continuous French television coverage to three French citizens and utterly radicalized Islamic Salafists deliberately murdering seventeen people.

After being surrounded in several buildings where they had taken hostages, the three men, in accordance with their extreme religious beliefs, refused to surrender. They chose finally to hurl themselves, while firing their Kalashnikovs at the anti-terrorist police units around them, to their own sudden deaths.

In their own Salafist terms, they had succeeded in killing French people they considered to be either blasphemous caricaturists or apostate Muslims or impious agents of an anti-Salafist government or simply French citizens of hated Jewish origins. They had also succeeded in achieving for themselves what they believed to be authentic martyrs' deaths.

Yet even the most knowledgeable commentators could not keep from asking how these three young French citizens had succumbed to such a profoundly inhuman radicalization.

Part of the critical aftermath to this tragedy, this time in Europe and not in the Middle East where even more terrible crimes within warring Islamic communities continued to take place almost daily in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, was the growing realization of a European-wide disarray.

The outspoken dismay was at just how such a profound conflict of mentalities could arise among those born, raised, and educated in a European country. And the dismay also was at whether French people and Europeans generally could do anything substantive to prevent such situations from taking place again.

But why the shock?

Why such a shock reaction to the Paris events of early January when the 70th anniversary of the Soviet liberation of Auschwitz on January 27th was approaching with all its echoes of the murderous conflicts between the Aryan and the Non-Aryan and between the Soviet and the Nazi ?

And why such a shock reaction to these Paris events when the horrific fighting in Eastern Ukraine was rekindling unbearable memories of Soviets and Ukrainians during the incalculable losses of the Holodymyr?

The shock to Europeans was a brutal reminder of the ever stubborn fact that very different mentalities are in ceaseless conflict. Unless those profound differences are continually confronted in ongoing observation, analysis, and sustained critical reflection, there can be no substantive and durable remedies for the immensities of evil and suffering that conflicting mentalities generate.

The philosophical reflections in these essays, like those in their companion volume, *In Times Like These: Essays in Ethics – Situations, Resources, Issues,* share at last one quite basic feature. They all arise from just such concerns with investigating in detail what conceptual resources might be available for durably resolving the so often murderous conflict of mentalities.

Part of what doing philosophy in Europe might look like today, I think, must involve taking up deeply divisive matters. One such matter is how to deal effectively with the globalization of deeply conflicting intuitions about the nature of human beings as persons and the inestimable ethical values of leading truly human lives.

In particular, these essays in ethics are all, in very different ways, about the great limitations but necessary reliance on intellectual intuition in philosophical ethics today.

That is, the enormous complexities of so many ethical situations in a technologically and informationally globalized world of conflicting mentalities requires ethical insight and not just philosophical argumentation. Yet because the contingency and fallibility of ethical insight and philosophical argument is so great, such necessary insight most often has to function, as it were, almost blindly. It must grope its uncertain ways towards the recognition and then realization of objectively true and perduring basic ethical values.

With the substantial help of many nonwestern materials, these essays might perhaps be taken as exercises in that kind of blindsight.

After an introductory section on "Orientations" where I begin with a series of observations on the nature and kinds of religious, literary, and ethical intuitions, the book goes on to explore several topics under three main headings.

Starting from contrasts between European reflexive mentalities and the kinds of mentality on exhibit in both classical Islamic and classical Japanese

literary representation, two essays in Part One, "Discourses," look into philosophical issues about cultural externalism and interpreting some figurative discourse metaphysically.

With instances of two contrasting non-European mentalities on hand, one Islamic the other Japanese, the two essays in Part Two, "Apprehending and Saying," focus more sharply on further instances, in particular, of Japanese verbal representation.

In the first essay here I look at the notion of how some Japanese reflections raise serious philosophical questions about the widespread European confidence in the capacities of natural languages to articulate satisfactorily what is truly real. Against this background I then take up in a second essay the difficult matter of how some claims about innocent human suffering might be rationally appraised in non-European languages and contexts.

In search of further understanding of some salient differences between European and non-European mentalities, two further essays in Part Three, "Ethics and Suffering", take up just one general ethical issue.

The first essay returns to the opening general themes of intuitions and figurative discourses and investigates an importantly different understanding of truth in the Japanese terms of "seeing" the fullness of actions rather than in the European terms of "understanding" the reasons for action. I then turn in the second essay in this section to what a not exclusively European ethics of suffering might require as essential elements.

By way of conclusion, an "Envoi" to these essays which as a whole focus on aspects of the non-European, Japanese mentality, I describe a monumental sculptural representation in Kamakura of a kind of intuitive seeing of the deepest human values, an instance of what I allude to here in the title of these essays as "blindly seeing."

Accordingly, the book closes with an intimation only of the inevitable limitations, some might even say the blindness, of exclusively Western philosophical reflection on such deeply important matters as the continuing ethical challenges facing Europeans today.

These revised essays have very much benefitted from the critical comments, suggestions, and philosophical worries of those who first invited their presentations and commented on them at various professional philosophy conferences and from those who later accepted reworked versions for publication. I have tried to acknowledge these persons in the endnotes to each of the essays. I am grateful to each and every one of these persons. I owe spe-

cial thanks to Hans Reiner Sepp for his encouragements and for having accepted this collection and its companion piece for his distinguished series *Libri nigri.* And I warmly thank Lukas Kotala for his outstanding work on formatting the difficult book manuscript.

I am particularly grateful to my Japanese colleagues during the course of 26 annual symposia in Japan and afterwards for reminding me all too often to "try to think differently." In particular, I thank Imamichi Tomonobu, Hashimoto Noriko, Inagaki Ryosuke, Ito Kunitake, Kato Shinro, Sakabe Megumi, Sasaki Ken-ichi, and Tsujimura Koichi.

My most important and more recent assistance, however, with various forms of these essay and with much other work as well, has come from three philosophers from distinguished Central and Eastern European philosophy departments – Volodymyr Turchynovskyy from the Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv in Ukraine, Martin Cajthaml from the Palacky University in Olomouc in the Czech Republic, and Czeslaw Porebski from the Jagiellonian University in Cracow, Poland.

Despite our all too evident differences – in language, in philosophical training, in university experience, and in cultural presuppositions – each most generously, and unfailingly, has continued to help me. And they have generously helped me not just as colleagues but as genuine friends.

It is their rather different Eastern and Central European mentalities from my own much more parochial and circumscribed states of mind that has often prompted me to fruitful second thoughts, especially about ethical matters. I am deeply pleased to be able here sincerely to thank each of them individually and all three of them together.

Peter McCormick
Paris, 15 May 2017

Introductions:
Intuitions: Religious, Literary, and Ethical[2]

Close to the centre of renewed reflection in Europe today on the possibility of a greater harmonization of varied national economic, political, social, defense, and cultural models are, perhaps surprisingly, philosophical questions about knowing how to act rightly. These are questions about what constitutes right action both at the individual and at the communal level, about what acting rightly is.

Part of the divergent responses if not answers to such questions in many of the newly complex ethical situations in Europe today have taken the form of the still controversial merits of what is called "moral intuitionism." And at the center of these discussions of moral intuitionism is what distinctions if any are finally to be made between the moral and the ethical.

Perhaps a more important issue lies here too. This is the issue of whether such a distinction can be properly made without considering the independent religious as well as the literary and ethical forms of intuition. The essays in this book take their inspiration from all three.

Moral Intuitionism

Moral intuitionism was one of the important general philosophical standpoints that dominated much European ethical discussion from the eighteenth through the first third of the twentieth century. In general, moral intuitionism may not unfairly be understood as the view that persons come to know basic objective moral truths not indirectly through, to take but one example, a species of inference. Rather, they come to know them directly by immediate awareness.

Such a general view, however, is not without its difficulties. For example, when intuition is understood as immediate awareness alone, difficult issues arise about the reliability of such awareness. Moreover, difficulties also arise about intuition's vulnerability to different kinds of self-deception. Yet after much thorough criticism through most of the twentieth century,

moral intuitionism today has again become the focus of renewed and constructive inquiry.[3]

Moral intuitionism, even when taken as the view that some persons reliably come to know basic objective moral truths directly by an immediate awareness, has a complicated history. That history includes its protracted discussion and argument in very different forms. Some of those forms appear in the work of Plotinus and Augustine, Aquinas and Ockham, and especially in their eighteenth-century elaborations in Fichte and the early Schelling during the transitions from Kant's overly suspicious views of intuition itself to Hegel's perhaps overly enthusiastic ones.[4]

Over the last century or so the most important instances of moral intuitionism in English-language philosophy were to be found in the works of Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900), especially the seventh edition of *The Methods of Ethics* (first published in 1874). Besides Sidgwick, other very important figures and works were

G. E. Moore (1873–1958), especially his *Principia Ethica* (1903), H. A. Pritchard's (1871–1947) *Duty and Interest* (1928), C. D. Broad's (1887–1971) *Five Types of Ethical Theories* (1930), and W. D. Ross's (1877–1971) *The Right and the Good* (1930).[5]

Although each of these English-language philosophers made several still important contributions to other areas of philosophy, arguably each also made a particularly important contribution to moral intuitionism.[6]

If we leave aside their other contributions and much of the necessary nuance for precisely detailing their contributions to moral philosophy, we may perhaps roughly summarize at least one major element in each of these philosophers' contributions to our understanding today of moral intuitionism.

Thus, Sidgwick[7] argued that, besides utilitarianism and egoism,[8] intuitionism as an investigation of intuitively self-evident principles as "absolute practical principles" for action was one of the three fundamental methods for establishing rational bases for moral action. Further, Sidgwick held that the intuitively grasped moral rightness of an action was equivalent to the maximization of its moral goodness

For his part, Moore[9] argued that, although some moral intuitions may allow us to grasp an intrinsic moral goodness in certain actions, goodness itself including moral goodness is apparently indefinable. In these contexts, Prichard[10] emphasized that not only was the moral goodness of those morally obligating actions that presented themselves intuitively to persons

indefinable; moral goodness was also – to use Moore's own cardinal term – unanalysable.[11]

Broad,[12] although working mainly outside ethics, nonetheless suggested that moral situations, just like any kind of situations, engaged perceptions on the part of the moral subject. Moreover, these perceptions comprised processes in which what he called "*sensa*" are presented to our intuitive capacities as the effects of a specifically mental kind of causation.

Ross went back to Sidgwick. Ross[13] argued that Sidgwick had been mistaken in taking the intuitively grasped moral rightness of an action to be equivalent to the maximization of its moral goodness. Instead, Ross argued that there are other so called prima-facie moral obligations that in some cases are more basic than and take priority over such a maximization.

Today, many of these seminal reflections continue to generate further critical consideration.[14] But when we reflect even briefly on these summary remarks, we can notice right away the pertinence for reconsiderations of moral intuitionism of focussing renewed inquiry on at least three selected themes. Those themes are moral discourse, moral knowledge, and moral motivations. For language, perception, and freedom are among the most central issues for understanding moral intuitionism.[15]

Many of these instructive historical and contemporary perspectives, however, risk remaining too technical for many thoughtful persons today. Moreover, considered ethical reflection today continues to neglect some of the most suggestive representations of ethical intuition, not just in professional philosophical discussions[16] but in literary works of art as well.[17]

Such suggestive literary representations are especially on view in Europe's distinctive high modernist poetry of suffering and passage.[18] More generally, many important instances of ethical intuition also find their expression in other types of figurative discourses.

The focus needs to be on the important notion of ethical intuitions about the sense and significance of the still insufficiently appropriated legacy of our most recent and tragic pasts. This legacy comprises especially the different kinds of human suffering so much in evidence throughout the last century of European history and culture.

Consider then briefly some recent reflections on the need for a special type of intuition in dealing with some of the still developing tragic situations in Ukraine.

Moral and Ethical Visions

These reflections might be put under the two titles, one in English and the other in French, that figured on the program of a recent international conference in Paris.[19] Interestingly, the titles do not suggest the same thing but two different things. Moreover, each title suggests different directions for further inquiry.

The English language version of the conference session title was, "A European Future: Recovering the Power of Moral Vision." This title suggests that Europe had a moral vision in the past that was lost. It also suggests that right now some reflective persons may – that is, are capable of – recovering this lost moral vision in the present. Adopting this title provisionally for some of our concerns here, let us suppose then that, historically speaking, Europe did have something we may vaguely but not improperly call "a moral vision."

Still, the title in English makes this perhaps overly vague talk of "a moral vision" more particular by suggesting at least four important issues. One such issue is just which Europe we decide to reflect on, the Eastern Europe of Byzantine orthodoxy, or the Western Europe of Roman Christianity, or some other Europe altogether.

Another question follows immediately: just what was that lost moral vision? Still more, in what senses are we to understand that a moral vision has some elusive property called, all too generally, a "power"? And finally, what is it about our present situations in Europe today as a whole that would enable persons so different as the many diverse people in both Western and Eastern Europe to recover, to find again, that moral vision?

Consider just as briefly now the French title for the same conference session in the light once again of our present concerns here. That title read, "*Retrouver une vision éthique de la construction européenne.*" Such a title suggests that the lost vision was not a moral vision but an ethical one. And the French title also suggests that this lost ethical vision was a vision not of Europe *tout court* but of the construction of Europe.

These second suggestions raise at least three further important initial questions. Under the same assumption as earlier that Europe at one time had a vision of some sorts, one further question might then go: just what good reasons are there, if any, for having to distinguish today between a European moral and a European ethical vision? Another further question is similar: do

our concerns call for a further distinction between moral and ethical visions not just of Europe but also of European construction?

And finally, at last here, do we need a distinction between the power to envision morally and ethically the continuation of the construction of Europe and the power to envision morally and ethically the very idea of Europe itself?

Before going on to my final section, consider some interim conclusions in the form of several summary remarks only.

Generally speaking, perhaps we may understand a powerful moral vision as a systematically developed set of intellectual intuitions and arguments concerning the nature and interconnections between rights, obligations, and duties.

And just as generally perhaps we may understand a powerful ethical vision as a systematically developed set of intellectual intuitions and arguments concerning the nature and interconnections among ethical values, and ethical ideals, and ethical responsibilities.

We may put this in other words in the form of two questions. Is the moral something deeply imminent; is the moral always an austere imperative that finally only we ourselves put into place? And is the ethical something deeply transcendent; is the ethical always a joyful summons from elsewhere that we can only respond to or not?

Now, if something like what I have just been sketching about the moral and the ethical is the case, then what we need to retrieve from the shadowy European past is both a moral and an ethical vision all at once. Yet without quite radical reforms of many sorts in Europe today, and especially in Eastern European countries like Ukraine tomorrow, I think that retrieving such moral and ethical visions will prove to be impossible.

But just what might be one of the central conditions for such a retrieval of past moral and ethical visions, of moral and ethical intuitions? In my final section I take up today in Europe's increasingly secular contexts a rather unfamiliar religious and not just philosophical proposal.

A Condition for Moral and Ethical Vision?

Several years ago, the then Vice Rector of the Ukrainian Catholic University (UCU) in Lviv, Professor Volodymyr Turchynovskyy, passed on to a distinguished French philosopher and former Dean of the Philosophy Faculty

at the *Institut catholique de Paris*, Professor Philippe Dumont-Capelle, a substantive suggestion. The suggestion was that of the Ukrainian Orthodox Catholic Bishop, a noted historian of Ukraine and at the time President of the UCU, Bishop Borys Gudziak.

Bishop Borys suggested, Turchynovskyy wrote, "that you address the following question: . . . What is the role of witness, communion (communication, relationship), and service in the contemporary world?"[20] In perhaps more secular terms some might ask whether witness is a condition for moral and ethical vision today.

The bishop's own question focuses on a family of terms and asks what is their role today. But before considering their role, we need to recall the ordinary senses, at least in English, of two only of the several key expressions here.

The question's context is "today." That is, the context is presumably the lived human situations in increasingly secularized European countries like France,[21] and especially in Eastern European countries like Ukraine.[22] Distinctively, Eastern European countries are still deeply mired in a thoroughly compromised ethical and religious post-Soviet culture.[23] In such contexts the senses of the word "witness" are often obscured.

Recall that in English the verbal sense of the word "witness," namely "to witness something," ordinarily denotes attesting to "a fact, an event, or statement." [24] Thus someone writes about attesting to "the true pre-history of the race through the *witness of* folklore and legend." Another writes that "The early Christians . . . made a triumphant *witness for* Christ." [25]

But in some post-soviet Eastern European societies today as well as in some thoroughly secularized societies in Western Europe, the distinction here between historical uses of "witness of" and other uses of the non-synonymous expression "witness for" is blurred. For the second use here is mainly religious. And many persons in such kinds of thoroughly secularized societies have difficulty with generally religious uses of words like "witness."

In English, religious uses of "witness" begin with Old English senses of witness as the "open profession or testimony . . . of one's religious faith through one's actions or words." In Medieval English this early religious sense deepens so as to specify the idea of witness as "the inward testimony of the conscience." In this period, the notion of witness tries to capture the sense of witness in, for example, Paul's remarks to the Romans, "[Gentiles] show that what the law requires is written on their hearts, to which their own conscience also bears witness." [26]

On these historical grounds then, witnessing seems to involve close connections not just to conscience. Witness also involves close connections between conscience and action. That is, to witness to one's conscientious beliefs without taking some kinds of related practical actions is not to witness at all. But besides speaking out, what actions are appropriate ones in just such contexts where witness is concerned?

In particular, (1) are there some central conditions today of individual, social, and political life in Eastern European post-Soviet societies that entail understanding the word "witness" in some new senses? [27] (2) Could such difficult conditions today force reconsiderations of just what witness in such societies might look like practically? (3) And, if so, how might such reconsiderations be warranted, not just in religious terms but in pluralistic and public ones as well?

In short, before discussing its roles, I think we need, especially, although not exclusively, to explore the senses and significance of "witness today". In doing so, perhaps we might come to a newly fruitful understanding of the nature of both moral and ethical intuitions especially in the dangerous situations continuing to face persons and communities in the European Union today.

Envoi

The essays in this book take up in various ways some of the increasingly diverse challenges to our present understandings of the moral and the ethical under different aspects of the polyvalent notions of moral intuitionism. However different these essays are from one another, they are intended to have as a common core the task of raising fruitful questions about the nature of ethics at a time of extraordinary change and transformation. For this kind of questioning is what is increasingly taking place in the still widely separated societies and opposed cultural groups in both Western and Eastern Europe today.

Endnotes

2 Some of this introduction includes revised versions of reflections first presented at the international conference, "*Nouveaux défis pour l'Ukraine et pour l'Europe:*

Théologie, Ethique, Politique," held at the *Collège des Bernardins* in Paris on October 9, 2014. I am grateful to the organizers for their kind invitation, especially to Volodymyr Turchinovskyy and Antoine Arjakovsky, and to several participants, especially Sophia Opatsky and Mykhailo Minakov, for their challenging questions and comments.

3 See for instance R. Audi, *The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2004), and the papers collected in *Ethical Intuitionism: Re-evaluations*, ed. P. Stratton-Lake (Oxford: Clarendon, 2002), especially P. Stratton-Lake's comprehensive, "Introduction," pp. 1–28, and in *The New Intuitionism*, ed. J. Graper Hernandez (London: Continuum, 2011), especially R. Audi's "Introduction," pp. 1–7.

4 In particular, for very important eighteenth-century reflections on kinds of intuition see X. Tilliette, *L'intuition intellectuelle de Kant à Hegel* (Paris: Vrin, 1995).

5 Excluding articles in journals and emphasizing the most recent work only, thoughtful and demanding critiques of differing versions of moral intuitionism can be found here and there in F. M. Kamm's *Intricate Ethics* (Oxford: OUP, 2007). K. A. Appiah, *Experiments in Ethics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2008), esp. pp. 73–120, A. Gibbard, *Reconciling Our Aims: In Search of Bases for Ethics* (Oxford: OUP, 2008, esp. pp. 11–32, T. Scanlon, *Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2008), *passim* under the rubric "moral principles," and some material on practical reason in C. M. Korsgaard, *Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity and Integrity* (Oxford: OUP, 2009). See also M. Zimmerman, *Living with Uncertainty: The Moral Significance of Uncertainty* (Cambridge: CUP, 2009).

6 Besides English language philosophical work on moral intuitionism, similar reflection has also marked much European reflection especially in the phenomenological tradition. In this introductory essay, however, I have chosen to concentrate mainly on English language reflection on intuition and moral intuitionism.

7 See also J. B. Schneewind, *Sidgwick's Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy* (Oxford: OUP, 1977).

8 Although nuances are necessary for particular accounts, standardly, that is, according to widely accepted reference works in philosophy, utilitarianism in ethical theory is generally the view "that answers all questions of what to do, what to admire, or how to live, in terms of maximizing utility or happiness." Egoism in its psychological form "is the view that people are always motivated by self-interest." In its ethical form, egoism "is the view that whether or not people are like this, they ought to be like this" (S. Blackburn, *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy*, 2nd ed. [Oxford: OUP, 2005], pp. 377 and 110 respectively; hereafter abbreviated as "*ODP*").

9 See also *Themes from G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics*, ed. S. Nuccetelli and G. Seay (Oxford: OUP, 2007).

[10] See also H. A. Prichard, *Moral Writings,* ed. J. MacAdam (Oxford: OUP, 2002).

[11] That is, in Moore's problematic technical idiom, not allowing of any proper articulation of the supposed relation between a moral sense datum and a moral object.

[12] See also *The Philosophy of C. D. Broad,* ed. P. A. Schilpp (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1959).

[13] See also W. D. Ross, *The Foundations of Ethics* (Oxford: OUP, 1939).

[14] For one distinguished example only see John Rawls's "Four Lectures on Henry Sidgwick," in his *Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2007), pp. 375–415.

[15] See for example M. R. DePaul, "Intuitions in Moral Inquiry," *Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory,* ed. D. Copp (Oxford: OUP, 2006), pp. 595–623.

[16] For recent articles see those in *The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory,* ed. D. Copp (Oxford: OUP, 2006), and *Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory,* ed. J. Dreier (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006).

[17] Recent well-informed discussion of central topics in philosophy and literature can be found in the chapters on art, literature, authors, practice, fiction, truth, and value in P. Lamarque's *The Philosophy of Literature* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009). Somewhat older discussions that make use of the Polish phenomenologist, Roman Ingarden's, views are to be found in P. McCormick, *Fictions, Philosophies and the Problems of Poetics* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998), and in its more historically oriented companion, *Modernity, Aesthetics and the Bounds of Art* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990).

[18] I first used this phrase in P. McCormick, *The Negative Sublime: Ethics, Warfare, and the Dark Borders of Reason* (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Winter, 2003), pp. 7–8.

[19] This was actually the case at the international conference at the Paris conference noted above where I first presented an unrevised and much shorter version of some of these remarks.

[20] Letter to Philippe Capelle of September 28, 2013. Cited with permission of both V. Turchynovskyy and P. Capelle.

[21] Note that "secularization" does not denote the same thing as what the distinctively and hardly translatable French word, "*laicization,*" denotes.

[22] For an important dossier on the current situation in Ukraine just before the critical meeting in Vilnius, Lithuania, on November 28, 2013 about possible European Union candidate status for Ukraine see "*Ukraine, La tentation européene,*" in *Le Monde,* September 26, 2013. See also the article on the release of J. Loutsenko, a minister in J. Timochenko's former government, in *Le Figaro,* October 4, 2013.

[23] See the summary descriptions in Bishop Gudziak's opening remarks, "The Modality and Virtue of Trust," in the Acts from a March 2013 international meeting in Lviv which, as I write, are forthcoming in the IIECI Series of the Ukrain,an Catholic University Press.

[24] For descriptive definitions and examples (respectively from works by A. S. Byatt and M. L. King) I rely here throughout on the two-volume, sixth edition (2007) of the *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles* (*SOED*).

[25] In both *SOED* examples, the emphasis is mine.

[26] Rom 2.15. The key word here is *summarturousēs*, from the verb, *summartureō*, meaning to support by testimony or witness. The English translation is from the currently standard 1989 New Revised Standard Version (based on the Nestle-Aland *Greek New Testament*) as reprinted in the ecumenical *The New Oxford Annotated Bible*, ed. M. D. Coogan *et al.*, 4th ed. (Oxford: OUP, 2010) which also includes books from the Greek and Slavonic bibles that do not appear in the Roman Catholic Canon.

[27] For example, recall the English expression used in Lviv and elsewhere, "the martyred Church," where the word "martyred" recalls the Greek NT sense stemming from the expressing cited above, *summartureō*, or giving testimony or witness.